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The growth rate of chief executive officers’ (CEOs) compensation has dramatically 
outpaced average employees’ pay increases. Scholars have not been able to reach a 
consensus on whether the financial performance of firms has a positive influence on 
CEOs’ compensation. Also, boards of directors lack a clear understanding of the 
relationship between financial performance of firms and CEOs’ incentive compensation 
in the U.S. banking industry. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the 
predictive relationship between financial performance of firms (measured by return on 
equity [ROE] and annual revenue) and CEOs’ total compensation in the U.S. banking 
industry. According to agency theory, which was the theoretical framework for this 
study, failing to understand such a relationship could cause a misalignment between 
CEOs’ compensation and the performance of firms. Hence, the research question was, 
does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ 
total compensation? Archival data from publicly traded U.S. banking firms were 
collected and analyzed. Multiple regression techniques were used to identify a 
statistically significant predictive model, F (2, 121) = 95.691, p < .000, R2 = .613. 
Changes in annual revenue were found to be significantly more sensitive than changes of 
ROE relative to the impact on changes in CEOs’ total compensation. This study may 
contribute to positive social change by raising individuals’ awareness of the importance 
of maintaining CEOs’ equitable compensation. Additionally, compensation committees 
of banking firms can use the findings from this study to evaluate their compensation 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study 
The average compensation for U.S. chief executive officers (CEOs) of Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies rose by more than 300% from the 1990s to the 2010s 
(Shue & Townsend, 2017). This trend in CEO compensation might be a reflection of the 
growth in profits of firms. In this study I evaluated, using a quantitative correlational 
design, the predictive relationship between firms’ return on equity (ROE), their annual 
revenues, and CEOs’ total compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in 
stock, and bonuses in options). The results of this study could add to the existing body of 
knowledge on the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and the financial 
performance of the firms that employ them. 
Background of the Problem 
The dramatic increase in CEOs’ compensation might not align with the financial 
performance of the firms that employ them. Results of previous studies on the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation have been varied. For 
instance, Nulla (2013b) found that CEOs’ total compensation and the financial 
performance of the firms that employed them were positively related in the financial 
service industry. However, Lin, Kuo, and Wang (2013) found that there was a negative 
relationship in other industries. 
Boards of directors (BODs) of companies appoint CEOs with the objective of 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Iqbal & Javed, 2017). However, CEOs might act in 
their own interests rather than that of their shareholders, if BODs fail to govern CEOs’ 
job performance by making compensation contingent on firm performance (Okoth & 
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Coşkun, 2016). As Nulla (2013a) noted, some BODs might not have a compensation 
structure in place to align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders. 
BODs might include incentive mechanisms in CEOs’ compensation packages, 
which are often composed of cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options in 
addition to salaries (Rau, 2017). On the other hand, shareholders’ interests depend on the 
financial performance of the firms in which they hold stock, where financial performance 
can be the measurements of ROE and annual revenue (Okoth & Coşkun, 2016). Using a 
statistical model might provide helpful findings about the predictive relationship between 
the financial performance of firms and CEOs’ total compensation. Such findings might 
also provide supportive information for BODs to use in considering their CEOs’ 
incentives as a part of corporate governance. 
Problem Statement 
CEOs’ compensation is inseparably tied to firm performance in U.S.-based banks, 
which implies that CEOs should receive reduced compensation when their firms 
experience negative market returns (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). During the 2006–2008 
financial crisis, more than 50% of the U.S. banking CEOs lost their incentive 
compensation (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). The general problem is that some firms in the 
banking industry might not maintain an effective structure for CEOs’ compensation, 
which could result in conflicts of interests between CEOs and their shareholders. The 
specific problem is that BODs of some U.S. banks lack an understanding of the predictive 





The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive 
relationship between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation. The 
independent variables (predictors) were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm. 
The dependent variable (criterion) was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for U.S. 
publicly traded banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify the predictor variables 
and the criterion variable. Data were available in firm-year format. 
This study may contribute to social change by providing new information that 
could assist members of BODs regarding decisions to incentivize CEOs, such as 
including various types of bonuses in CEOs’ compensation packages. Misalignment 
between CEOs’ compensation and the performance of firms may be of concern to the 
public (Nulla, 2013b). However, the public and the other stakeholders might have limited 
awareness about the extent to which such a misalignment may have a negative impact on 
financial performance of the firm. This study could lead BODs to a better understanding 
of how firms’ financial performance should affect CEOs’ compensation, which may 
contribute to improved public perception. 
Nature of the Study 
I determined that a  quantitative methodology was appropriate for examining the 
relationship between the predictor variables and the criterion variable. Quantitative 
researchers seek to understand and generalize a phenomenon by testing numerical data, 
measuring variables, and building statistical models (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). 
Guetterman, Fetters, and Creswell (2015) asserted that qualitative researchers, instead, 
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focus on developing a theory, understanding individuals’ experiences, or exploring a 
phenomenon. However, the focus of this study was on the empirical examination of the 
relationship between predictor variables and criterion variable. Because qualitative study 
does not involve use of a statistical approach to examine the relationship between 
variables (Birchall, Murphy, & Milne, 2016), I concluded that a qualitative method was 
not appropriate for my investigation.  
In addition to choosing a method, researchers need to decide on the strategies of 
inquiry within a research methodology, which is the research design (Wilson, 2016). I 
determined that a quantitative correlational design was the most suitable one for this 
study. A correlational design, which is nonexperimental in nature, allows researchers to 
establish the relationship between variables without any manipulation (Hughes, Matt, & 
O’Reilly, 2015). True experimental and quasi-experimental designs were not appropriate 
for this study because they are used for assessing cause-and-effect relationships (van 
Loon, de Bruin, van Gog, van Merrienboer, & Dunlosky, 2014). Using a causal-
comparative design, a researcher examines a causal factor and compares differences 
between variables (Bonita et al., 2014; Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). The 
focus of this study was on examining the relationship between the variables of interest 
rather than determining whether they were causally related to one another. A descriptive 
design is more suited to providing an overview of the relationship between variables than 




Does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and 
CEOs’ total compensation? 
Hypotheses 
H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between the ROE of firms, 
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking 
industry. 
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between the ROE of firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry. 
Theoretical Framework 
Agency theory provided the framework for this study. This theory stems from the 
work of Berle and Means (1932), who observed that leaders of modern companies often 
separate ownership from operational control. This separation of ownership from control 
resulted in the principal-agent relationship, where managers, as agents of the 
organization, perform actions in the best interests of the owners (principals; Berle & 
Means, 1932). However, agency theory also relates to the assumption of the economic 
man, an imaginary figure who can act rationally for the optimization of self-interests 
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Mitnick (2015) expanded agency theory by arguing that a CEO 
of a firm who might pursue his or her own benefits over those of the firm if performance 
of the firm and the CEO’s incentives are not aligned. Eisenhardt (1989) stated that the 
assumptions of agency theory had two fundamental tenets: the conflict of interest 
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between the principal and the agent, and the information asymmetry between both 
parties. 
Agency theory was applicable to this study because my focus was on finding the 
relationship between the best interests of CEOs and those of firms. I surmised that 
bonuses in CEO compensation might be considered the incentive in the principal-agent 
relationship and might encourage managers to work harder to improve performance of 
their firms. Jensen and Mecking (1976) identified the cost of monitoring the CEO’s 
performance as the agency cost and further suggested that organizations—or their 
BODs—should have strong incentive mechanisms in place for individuals to minimize 
agency cost. Hence, the CEOs’ self-interests (the compensation received from the 
company) and the owners’ best interests (performance of the firm) need to achieve 
consistent alignment.  
In the present study, CEO’s compensation was a straightforward measurement 
(the criterion variable), whereas ROE and annual sales revenue were the indicators (the 
predictor variables) for performance of the firm. I used relevant data as the measurements 
of CEO’s compensation and performance of the firm. The theoretically expected 
relationship, namely higher compensation of a CEO, might lead to better performance of 
a firm. 
Operational Definitions 
Annual revenue: The amount of money that a company receives from sales per 
year (Benedettini, Neely, & Swink, 2015). 
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Bonus in stock: The amount of payment in addition to the salary that a person 
receives in the form of company’s stock (Paz & Griffin, 2014). 
Bonus in option: The rewarding privilege in addition to the salary that a person 
receives in the form of company’s stock option grant (Paz & Griffin, 2014). 
Cash bonus: The amount of money paid in addition to the salary that a person 
receives (Paz & Griffin, 2014). 
CEO total compensation: The sum of salary, cash bonus, and non-cash bonuses 
that a CEO receives (Paz & Griffin, 2014). 
Non-cash bonus: The amount of payment in addition to the salary that a person 
receives in forms other than money (Samina & Zaman, 2015). 
Return on equity: The result of aftertax profit divided by stockholders’ equity 
(Masum, 2014), or the ratio of net income and net assets, which serves as a measurement 
of how much profit shareholders receive on their investments (Pletzer, Nikolova, 
Kedzior, & Voelpel, 2015). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are facts that, while considered to be true, have not gone through a 
verification process (Wohlin & Aurum, 2015). Unverified information assumed to be true 
can include the supporting theory of the study being invalid or still under investigation 
and the methodology used being ineffective for this study. In this study, I assumed that 
the data collected from annual reports regarding the financial performance of firms were 
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accurate, as were data collected from archival databases containing the CEOs’ 
compensation. 
Limitations 
Limitations are potential weaknesses of the study that are mostly out of the 
researcher’s control (Cunha & Miller, 2014; Green, Tonidandel, & Cortina, 2016). The 
limitations for this study were that the target population included only publicly listed 
banks in the United States and data collected spanned years 2010 to 2015. Hence, the 
results might not be valid for other industries or time periods. Also, I used archival data 
for the study. Other researchers might achieve different results if they perform a similar 
evaluation using a different type of data collection method. Lastly, stakeholders in the 
banking industry might interpret these results differently. 
Delimitations  
Delimitations of a study are actions that researchers decide not to perform because 
of the scope or boundaries of the study (Domingos et al., 2014; Newcomer, Marion, & 
Earnhardt, 2014). The two predictor variables in this study were potentially correlated, 
which might have had an impact on results of the study. I proceeded with the study, being 
aware of the risks of yielding poor results if multicollinearity occurred in the data 
analysis process. However, I was prepared to address the matter if the results were poor 
when the data analysis procedures were complete. The delimitations of this study were as 
follows: I did not extend the inquiry into components of corporate governance other than 
CEOs’ compensation. The examination was only of publicly traded U.S.-based banks; I 
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did not include privately held banking corporations in the study. Also, I only used two 
forms of measurements for organizational financial performance. 
Significance of the Study 
Contribution to Business Practice 
Although CEOs’ compensation has attracted much attention among financial 
researchers, BODs of companies still lacked an understanding of the relationship between 
CEOs’ compensation and financial performance of firms (Lin et al., 2013). Prior 
researchers have had mixed results in examining this relationship in other industries. Lin 
et al. (2013) were not able to identify a general relationship across 10 different industries. 
Nulla (2013b), however, found a positive relationship within the financial service 
industry. In this study, I examined the U.S. banking industry to address a gap in business 
practice revealed in the literature I reviewed. 
The results of the study may effectively contribute to business practice by 
increasing knowledge about the connection between CEOs’ compensation and financial 
performance of public banking firms in the United States. Lin et al. (2013) found, 
through an examination of this relationship, that business practices are enhanced by 
adopting a strategic and fair CEOs’ compensation structure that links to the performance 
of firms. Additionally, BODs of companies can better understand the importance of 
having strategies for developing efficient CEO compensation structures. BODs might be 
more confident in monitoring the performance of firms on behalf of their shareholders 
than before (Lin et al., 2013). 
10 
 
Implications for Social Change 
The results of this study carry a positive implication for social change by 
potentially raising the level of public awareness regarding the risks associated with 
misalignment between performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Banking industry 
stakeholders did not possess a clear understanding of the risks associated with the 
possible mismatches between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms (Cerasi & 
Oliviero, 2015). The public might gain insight about how to address their concerns about 
performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Members of BODs might not understand 
the risks and costs associated with CEOs’ decisions on behalf of the companies without 
proper incentive mechanisms (Mitnick, 2015). Therefore, this study may be useful to 
both organizations in the public banking industry and to society. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
A review of the professional and academic literature involved an in-depth inquiry 
into various sources, such as academic journals, technical and research reports, 
publications of professional affiliations, seminal work, and scholarly books. My initial 
search yielded more than 600 articles on research methods, theoretical framework, 
financial performance of firms, and CEOs’ compensation. Then, I shifted my focus to 
financial, economic, and managerial journals, which resulted the inclusion of 88 articles 
from journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Annual Review of Financial 
Economics, Financial Management, International Review of Finance, Journal of 
Accounting and Finance, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Review of Quantitative 
11 
 
Finance and Accounting, Journal of Banking & Finance, The Journal of Finance, and 
Journal of Organizational Behavior. 
My strategy for searching the literature began with the keywords and phrases, 
CEOs’ compensation and financial performance of firms. I then searched for literature on 
my theoretical framework by using the key phrase, agency theory. An additional search 
included a combination of the following keywords: banking industry, executive 
compensation, corporate governance, executive compensation structure, and corporate 
performance. In conducting my search, I used a few filtering techniques to ensure the 
relevance and currency of the literature. These filters consisted of the following: selecting 
the publication year to be older than 2013; excluding journals that were not peer-
reviewed; and excluding articles from fields other than finance, management, or 
economics. 
In searching for literature, I used Walden University Library databases, Google 
Scholar (using the citation chaining function), Social Science Research Network 
database, Education Resources Information Center database, U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, and Amercian Bankers Association. As a result, the literature review included 
95 sources, of which more than 85% were peer-reviewed with publication dates less than 
5 years old (see Table 1; also see Appendix A for a breakdown of the frequency and 














% < 5 years old 6 + years old 
Peer reviewed articles 82 8 90 94.7 
Other journal articles 4  4  
Books  1 1  
Total 86 9 95 90.5 
Note. Articles from peer-reviewed journals which were published in the past 5 years 
constituted 86.3% of the total sources. 
 
This review of the literature is organized according to the following four sections. 
The first part is a restatement of the purpose statement of the study and hypotheses to 
remind the reader of the intended examination. I then present an analysis of the literature 
regarding my theoretical framework to provide context for the examination. Next is an 
analysis of the predictor variables of ROE of the firm and annual revenues of the firm, as 
well as the synthesized literature on these measurements. The last section is a review of 
the literature pertaining to the criterion variable of CEO’s compensation and the literature 
on its measurement. 
Application to the Applied Business Problem  
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive 
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options). 
The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm. The 
criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for U.S. publicly traded 
banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify both the predictor variables and the 
criterion variable. The examination was based upon the following hypotheses:  
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H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between ROE of firms, 
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking 
industry. 
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between ROE of firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry. 
Literature on Agency Theory 
Agency theory originated from the work of Berle and Means in 1932, who stated 
that modern companies often have the separated ownership from operational control, 
which represent the principal-agent relationship. Berle and Means (1932) evaluated the 
200 largest U.S.-based nonfinancial firms in 1929 in their quantitative study and found 
that 44% did not have any individual ownership interest. Most companies owned 20% of 
their stock—a share Berle and Means perceived was also at an approximately minimum 
level—which indicated that the companies needed to attain control of operation. 
Managers, as the agents, perform actions in the best interests of owners (principals), 
according to Berle and Means. However, agency theory also relates to the assumption of 
economic man, an imaginary figure who can act rationally for the optimization of self-
interests (Bosse & Phillips, 2016).  
Eisenhardt (1989) stated that agency theory had two fundamental tenets: (a) a 
conflict of interest between principal and agent and (b) information asymmetry between 
both parties. The agent may also be the shareholder of the firm, who will likely act on 
maximizing the value of the firm (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Berle and Means (1932) then 
analyzed and categorized 88 firms that owned 58% of the total assets among the top 200 
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management-controlled ones. Of these, in only 11% of firms did owners possess a 
majority of the firms’ shares. 
Mitnick (2015) studied the origins of agency theory and found that CEOs might 
pursue their own interests if they perceived that their incentives did not align with 
performance of firms. Balafas and Florackis (2014) used this theory to examine the 
effects of CEO compensation on shareholder value by comparing firms that provided 
their CEOs with excessive fees and other firms in the same industry that did not provide 
their CEO with excessive fees. Using data from a large sample of U.K.-listed companies 
for the period of 1998–2010, Balafas and Florackis found that higher CEO compensation 
could lead to lower subsequent short-term returns, whereas firms that provided CEOs 
with low incentive distribution experienced the opposite. 
Jensen and Mecking (1976) integrated various components of the theory of 
property rights, the theory of agency, and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the 
ownership structure for a firm, which aims to determine the firm’s equity and debt. Using 
agency theory, Brisker, Colak, and Peterson (2014) found that owners experienced 
information gaps in the external environment, market trends, and actual business 
situations of their firms because they were not engaged in the specific business activities 
of their firms. To counter the effects of these information gaps, Bosse and Phillips (2016) 
suggested that the principal need to employ a monitoring mechanism on the agent’s 
performance. 
Jensen and Mecking (1976) began by defining the meaning of agency costs. Next, 
they determined the relationship between the issue of separation and control from the 
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perspective of agency costs. Finally, Jensen and Mecking clarified the nature of the 
agency costs caused by outside equity and debt. They used the theory of ownership 
structure to identify the agency cost as the cost of monitoring CEO performance, and 
concluded that firms should develop strong incentives programs to minimize agency cost 
(Jensen & Mecking, 1976). Brisker et al. (2014) hypothesized that executives whose 
compensation was highly equity-based were motivated to avoid ownership dilution by 
timing their seasonal equity offers to periods when investors in the firm could 
temporarily overprice their stocks. A mere 1% change in stock price can lead to 
significant changes in executives’ wealth.  
Aided by agency theory, Brisker et al. (2014) found that CEOs of firms with 
relatively high compensation experienced abnormally low stock returns and unfavorable 
changes in operational performance in the 3 years following the change in stock price. In 
general, the findings led Brisker et al. to conclude that principals sought wealth 
maximization while agents strove for benefit maximization, a mismatch that could create 
inevitable conflicts of interest between the two groups. The firms that experienced 
positive abnormal returns outperformed firms where CEOs received compensation at the 
top of the incentive compensation distribution (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). Higher 
incentive pay also led to lower future operating performance. The development of social 
productivity and the continuous expansion of production scale might affect the principal-
agent relationship (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). In the contemporary corporate 
environment, information asymmetry between owners of firms (principals) and managers 
(agents) can negatively affect the relationship (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). 
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Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) investigated incentive system designs in firms in 
France and Canada using agency theory with a particular focus on the relationships 
between the characteristics of BODs and earnings management (a proxy of earnings 
quality). Through performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDA), Jouber and 
Fakhfakh carried out three separate regressions on a full sample consisting of a French 
subsample and a Canadian subsample to determine institutional features and BOD 
characteristics that can affect PMDA. Jouber (2016) investigated how CEOs’ pay relative 
to firm performance compensation schemes might align with the executives’ incentives. 
By using a quantitative logit and stepwise regression design, Jouber collected sample data 
of executive compensation for 231 publicly traded companies in Canada, France, United 
Kingdom, and the United States over the period of 2004–2008. 
Through a regression analysis on panel data of 180 French and Canadian listed 
firms from 2006 to 2008, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) investigated the impact of 
institutional features on the behavior of earnings management, which were the strongest 
incentives to management discretion through a PMDA. They conducted three separate 
panel regressions to determine the effects of board characteristics and institutional 
features on the PMDA. Jouber (2016) found that pay-to-performance incentives were 
likely favorable to shareholders because these schemes tended to contribute to value 
creation for the firm.  
Further, the effects on long-term total shareholder returns were not unanimously 
applicable to all firms; companies that experienced growth would have higher market 
value in the future (Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2011). CEOs’ pay for performance incentives 
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served the interests of shareholders by creating value for the firms (Jouber, 2016). Results 
of Jouber’s study were the same as those reported earlier by Jouber and Fakhfakh 
regarding the effects of incentives on long-term total shareholder returns, but Jouber also 
found higher quality corporate governance of executive compensation affected the level 
of investors’ protection. 
The uncertainty of current investment income compounds the difficulties of 
measuring performance of agents (Banker, Darrough, Rong & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013). 
Banker et al. developed a two-period principal-agent model to test their theoretical 
predictions utilizing CEO compensation data collected from the period of 1993–2006. On 
the other hand, Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter (2010) applied agency theory to 
their meta-analysis of existing literature by examining the relationship between CEOs’ 
compensation and the financial performance of firms.  
Banker et al. (2013) found BODs of growth companies tended to raise the 
proportion of equity earnings in CEOs’ compensation structure to reduce agency costs. 
The nature of investment opportunities also affects executive compensation structure. 
Investment or investment opportunities that were more uncertain and needed more time 
to succeed were more likely to be associated with potential proxy conflicts (Banker et al., 
2013). Nyberg et al. (2010) concluded the quality of the primary data, an emphasis on 
equity-based compensation, and the mismatch of short-term or long-term incentives were 
limitations to applicability of agency theory. Based on the reconceptualization of CEOs’ 
compensation to CEOs’ return, Nyberg et al. discovered a stronger alignment of CEOs’ 
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compensation and shareholders’ interests than had been reported in the previous 
literature. 
Pandher and Currie (2013) conducted a quantitative correlational study examining 
how CEOs’ compensation and compensation composition can be strategic factors in the 
capacity of firms to generate value, the uncertainty of resource advantage, and the 
competitive interaction of the firm stakeholders with their top executives. Pandher and 
Currie used an analytical framework wherein CEOs and stakeholders pressed for the 
surplus of firms as utility-maximizing claimants according to their bargaining power, 
while providing shareholders with market-based returns. Pandher and Currie found that 
executives were self-serving and might not act in shareholders’ best interests to maximize 
profits for the firm, which agreed with the findings reported by Nyberg et al. (2010). 
In a mixed-methods study, Larkin, Pierce, and Gino (2012) focused on the 
psychological cost of nonexecutive compensation to analyze agency theory by 
investigating the pay-to-performance system from a different perspective. Larkin et al. 
first conducted a qualitative case study using the survey and interview instruments on 
data of selected firms in California. Next, they examined how psychological costs from 
overconfidence and social comparison can lead to reductions in the accuracy of 
individual performance-based compensation by using a quantitative cause-and-effect 
analysis design. Larkin et al. found that compensation was a strategic motivator for 
workers, which could also lead to overall better productivity and firm performance. 




Larkin et al. (2012) concluded that even though agency theory provides a 
framework for the development of compensation strategies, the theory fails to take into 
account several psychological factors that can improve costs of performance-based 
compensation. The researchers argued that performance-based pay increases agent costs 
because of psychological costs such as social comparison and overconfidence (Larkin et 
al., 2012; Pandher & Currie, 2013). Therefore, Larkin et al. proposed better compensation 
options that were team-based, seniority-based, or flatter compensation. However, the use 
of compensation systems might have strategic significance for corporations. Larkin et al. 
pointed out the limitation of the agency theory was disregarding the strategic effects of 
compensation systems. 
Other researchers’ findings were different from those of Larkin et al. (2012) 
regarding the value of agency theory. For example, Cao and Wang (2013) conducted a 
mixed-methods study by integrating agency theory into search theory to examine 
executive compensation in market equilibrium. They analyzed the optimal contracting 
strategy of individual firms under arbitrarily fixed outside options for CEOs, where a 
CEO can choose to stay or quit after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the 
firm. Then, the authors explored the relationship between the risk level of the firm and 
the optimal pay-to-performance ratio (Cao & Wang, 2013). Cao and Wang tested on a 
sample of 1,890 firms and 3,181 CEOs with data from ExecuComp database for the 
period of 1992–2009. They found that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio was less than 
1, even when the CEO was risk-neutral, and that the equilibrium pay-to-performance 
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sensitivity depended positively on the idiosyncratic risk of the firm and negatively on the 
systematic risk (Cao & Wang, 2013).  
Chakravarty and Grewal (2016) used agency theory as the theoretical framework 
in their quantitative study to analyze a combination of ExecuComp, Capital IQ, and 
Kantar Media Intelligence on 515 firms during the period of 2001–2009. Chakravarty and 
Grewal suggested that granting more stock options and restricted stocks could mitigate 
CEO’s short-term disincentives and, in return, encourage CEOs to invest more in 
advertisement and research and development (R&D). Liao and Lin (2017) studied how 
R&D investments of firms might have an impact on firm performance and found a 
positive relationship in between. Therefore, the spending on R&D and advertising 
mediated the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance (book value, 
sales, dividend payout, and return on assets [ROA] of firms in the given study; 
Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016).  
R&D spending also provided disincentives for the CEOs; these disincentives 
could create the problems such as earnings expectation to the subsequent analysts’ 
anticipation, declining sales, worse economic conditions, and limited tenure in the firm 
(Chen, Ho, & Ho, 2014). The risk compensation would have a direct impact on agents’ 
decisions that involve capital investment, R&D expenses, and corporate diversification 
(Chen, Ho, et al., 2014). In contrast to Chen, Ho, et al., Chakravarty and Grewal (2016) 
suggested that if CEOs’ compensation were set according to long-term scope, the CEOs 
would act in the best interests of long-term goals and perform more risk-taking behaviors. 
Furthermore, the effects would be larger in smaller firms because larger companies are 
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not likely to improve the equity-to-bonus ratio on a large scale. Therefore, the research 
was consistent with agency theory, indicating CEOs’ compensation aligned with 
performance of firms from a long-term perspective (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). 
Review of Relevant Literature on Predictor Variables 
Return on equity. Analysts utilize performance measures to determine how well 
a profit-seeking organization is faring; ROE is one of the strongest predictors (Ahsan, 
2013). In a quantitative study, Samad (2015) described ROE as one of the most important 
ratios for investors to check. This indicator is quite popular among analysts, financial 
managers, and shareholders because it represents the outcome of DuPont analysis, which 
is a widely used financial ratio analysis (Samad, 2015). Ahsan, as part of a literature 
synthesis review, evaluated why financial managers, analysts, and researchers seek to 
determine the value of a company through traditional measurements such as earnings per 
share, returns on assets, and dividends per share. Ahsan designed a quantitative 
correlational study to determine why experts described ROE as one of the most 
commonly used indicators for firms to gauge their performance based on the assumption 
of given fixed assets, net working capital, equity, and tax rates. Ahsan found that ROE 
was an appealing measurement for analysts because it links the income statement to the 
balance statement. 
Earnings ratio is related to equity ratio. However, studies later revealed that 
serious flaws existed in using ROE as a measure of firm performance. One of the main 
limitations was that earnings are a manipulatable factor, even in a legal way (Ahsan, 
2013). Changes in accounting policies within the framework of generally accepted 
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accounting principles (GAAP) can also lead to changes in earnings (Ahsan, 2013). 
Rappaport (1986) indicated that asset turnover, or the second component of ROE, can be 
vulnerable to inflation. Asset turnover and ROE can increase due to inflation, but not due 
to the performance of the firm, which might increase even if assets are not being utilized 
effectively. Rappaport also found that in the 1970s, even though the earnings of S&P 500 
companies decreased drastically, ROEs of firms still increased because of significant 
financial padding and increased levels of asset turnover. While the firms appeared as if 
they were performing well because of their increased ROEs, their market returns were 
poor (Rappaport, 1986). 
Another flaw is that computation of ROE is often made after the cost of debt, but 
before considering the cost of capital. If capital gearing increased, ROE would increase 
as well just because returns earned on the borrowed money are still higher than the cost 
of borrowings (Ahsan, 2013). However, this argument is not an accurate picture of the 
value of the firm because increasing debts or capital gearing beyond a specific level can 
also lead to the devaluation of the company and the share price to decrease (Ahsan, 
2013). Xing, Howe, and Anderson (2017) asserted that ROE was a short-term indicator to 
boost the perceived annual performance of a firm. Pursuing higher ROE through 
increased capital gearing can lead to wealth destruction (Ahsan, 2013).  
ROE is the calculation of profit after tax and preference dividends of a specific 
year, divided by the book value of equity at the start of the year, which consists of issued 
ordinary share capital in addition to the share premium and reserves (Xing et al, 2017). 
Average equity can also be used for the computation (Ahsan, 2013, Xing et al., 2017). 
23 
 
Ahsan stated that ROE is composed of three ratios: (a) profitability ratio, (b) asset 
turnover ratio, and (c) financial leverage. ROE increases or improves if one of these 
ratios also improves (Ahsan, 2013). If profitability, which is earnings divided by sales 
improves, the ROE can improve. If assets usage is efficient while financial leverage 
increases, the same effect could happen. Over time, however, studies revealed that 
improving ROE does not equate to higher shareholder value (Ahsan, 2013).  
Annual revenue. Annual revenue is a strong indicator of firm growth. Revenue 
growth is a sign that a company is performing well (Feng, Morgan, & Reco, 2017). 
According to Feng et al., present value (PV) of a firm is the PV from expected cash flows 
to be generated by the firm in the future. The most important input in valuation, 
especially for the firms in a high-growing industry, is the growth rate to predict future 
revenue and earnings (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017).  
Growth in revenue tends to be more persistent than growth in earnings, which are 
also much more predictable than growth in earnings (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017). 
Accounting choices often have less impact on annual revenue than on annual earnings, 
which applies specifically to technology firms because their executives exercise more 
discretion when deciding on R&D spending (Xing et al., 2017). Therefore, the 
accountants of firms can just transfer earnings between accounting periods, which is 
difficult to do with revenues (Feng et al., 2017).  
In addition, revenue growth over time has been found to be consistently correlated 
with earnings growth, which makes historical growth in revenues much more useful for 
forecasting and analyzing firm performance compared to historical growth in earnings 
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(Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017). Feng et al. found that focusing on revenue growth 
instead of earnings growth could better determine the pace of growth. Furthermore, the 
momentum of growth could be carried over for the long term (Feng et al., 2017). 
Compared to earnings growth, changes in annual revenue are less volatile and not 
as easily affected by accounting policy changes (Feng et al., 2017). Annual revenue 
changes could determine effects of changes in firm size, which could also be a more 
accurate measurement for making projections for the future (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et 
al., 2017). To calculate annual revenue, the firm relies on the computation of the amount 
of money received in exchange for goods and services. Annual revenue is important for 
analyzing and measuring financial ratios, such as gross margin and gross margin 
percentage (Feng et al., 2017). 
Review of Relevant Literature on Criterion Variable 
Executive compensation. CEOs provide management services to the 
organization in return for compensation. Executive compensation committees established 
the ownership of firms determine CEOs’ compensation program based on the need to 
retain executives and maintain continuity in leadership (Veliyath, George, Ye, 
Hermanson, & Tompkins, 2016). Compensation committees originally developed 
compensation packages as a method of competing for managerial talent within the open 
market and ensuring that organizations could compete for scarce talents (Veliyath et al., 
2016). Over time, CEOs’ compensations have increased with the size of the organization, 




Executive compensation includes basic annual salary, bonus, and future contract 
(DeYoung, Peng, & Yan, 2013). Among these types of compensation, the basic annual 
salary is a fixed compensation, which is independent of the business performance of the 
firm, whereas executive bonuses have a significant positive correlation with the business 
performance of the firm (DeYoung et al., 2013). CEOs’ forward contracts typically 
appear in the form of stock awards or grants to stock options that could be redeemed as 
actual cash rewards after a certain period (Bettis, Bizjak, & Kalpathy, 2015). To measure 
CEO compensation, corporations have formed a compensation structure in business 
practice; this structure uses a combination of cash, options, restricted stock, and other 
bonuses (Rau, 2017). Executive compensation could be categorized into following types 
(a) short-term income, (b) long-term income, and (c) deferred incentive income, which 
specifically includes (a) base salary, (b) bonus, (c) stock, (d) stock options, and (e) other 
forms (Shan & Walter, 2016; Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014). 
Increasing the proportion of equity earnings, such as the proportion of stock 
options in the compensation structure, could effectively integrate the long-term benefits 
of the company with the CEOs’ personal interests, thereby helping to enhance the value 
of the company (Ju, Leland, & Senbet, 2014). Performance-based income (bonuses) is an 
essential variable for motivating agents, which could also affect the growth of enterprises 
(Indjejikian, Matejka, Merchant, & Van der Stede, 2014). Increasing risk might create 
changes in wealth that might occur as a result of changes in the value of the firm (Ju et 
al., 2014). As CEOs’ compensation in the form of stock options increases, risk taking 
might also increase due to the potential for upside return in stock options, but a set floor 
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for losses (Tosun, 2016). While stock returns for the investor (stockholder) are crucial, 
these returns are also forward-looking and reflect the investors’ future expectations of 
stock price (Banker et al., 2013). Specifically, debt levels for firms decrease as a CEO’s 
stock options as a proportion to pay increase (Tosun, 2016).  
The design of CEOs’ compensation structure should satisfy the following two 
conditions: (a) include adequate risk income in the incentive structure of executives; and 
(b) carry out effective supervision for executives to reduce the cost of risk (Brisker et al., 
2014). Gaertner (2014) examined the role of CEO compensation in tax risk to firms by 
analyzing the relationship between aftertax CEO incentives and effective tax rate (ETR). 
Gaertner found a negative association between aftertax CEO incentives and ETR. Based 
on that finding, Gaertner concluded that CEO incentives, as well as the bonus, are an 
effective tool for mitigating tax risks by minimizing tax exposure. Furthermore, CEO’s 
aftertax incentives are positively associated with cash compensation and aftertax savings 
(Gaertner, 2014). Therefore, Gaertner suggested that the result is consistent with the 
economic theory that additional tax-related compensation risk should have the 
proportionally incremental compensation.  
Determinants of executive compensation. Many factors determine the level of 
executive compensation within a company. The executive board establishes executive 
compensation and selects individuals to serve in the position of CEO. Liu, Liu, and Diaz 
(2016) examined how larger firms with stricter disclosure rules can affect CEO 
compensation. Liu et al. found that increasing CEO compensation is the result of stricter 
monitoring of the chief executive and institutional shareholders of corporate stock. 
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Institutional shareholders and outside directors comprise most executive boards and are 
responsible for monitoring the CEOs’ compensation and performance of the firm (Liu et 
al., 2016). Corporate consultants recommend that executive compensation originates with 
rewards, which provide an increase in wealth based on stock appreciation of the company 
(Kaplan & Minton, 2012). By using the option of awarding stock options, BODs can 
create rewards and incentives that not only align the interests of shareholders and CEOs, 
but also create a financial reward for improved performance (Kaplan & Minton, 2012). 
Kaplan and Minton (2012) evaluated trends in CEOs’ compensation from 1992 to 
2007 among large U.S. companies and found an explanation for trends in CEOs’ 
turnover. They found the annual turnover of CEOs was higher than the estimates from 
previous studies of earlier periods. Kaplan and Minton asserted that CEOs’ compensation 
greatly determined the turnover rate. Since the 1970s, institutional ownership and outside 
directors serving on executive compensation boards have increased, as has turnover of 
CEOs (Kaplan & Minton, 2012). However, BODs must remain independent to create 
alignment with equity incentives (Laux, 2015). Laux determined that when compensation 
committees had a higher proportion of nonexecutives as members, CEO salary 
compensation was lower, but equity compensation was higher. Because the use of stock 
options provides an alignment with the performance of the firm, corporate boards must 
ensure that compensation committees have fewer executive members, which increases 
the use of equity compensation (Laux, 2015).  
CEOs may also receive salaries and bonuses based on their past performance 
(Banker et al., 2013). Cremers and Grinstein (2014) analyzed the variation of CEO 
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compensation practices and relevant controversy from the perspective of the market for 
CEO talent. The authors followed a quantitative correlational design to examine the 
relationship between CEOs’ compensation benchmarking, pay-for-luck, and the structure 
of the CEO talent pool by collecting data from ExecuComp and Compustat databases 
(Cremers & Grinstein, 2014). To measure the variables, Cremers and Grinstein used the 
control variables of performance measures (including ROE from the previous year, 
changes in the log of shareholder value from the previous year, and growth in the log of 
sales) and CEOs’ tenure, as well as the independent variable of the percentage for CEOs’ 
appointments within the same industry. Cremers and Grinstein found that only CEOs’ 
compensation had benchmarks against the firms in industries that did not require firm-
specific CEO talent, where pay-for-luck was another popular practice that has asymmetry 
between compensation and performance. However, the CEOs’ compensation packages 
did not rely on whether the CEOs had firm-specific talent (Cremers & Grinstein, 2014).  
Cremers and Grinstein (2014) concluded that the structure of the CEO talent pool 
was related to marginal decisions on CEO compensation (benchmarking and pay-for-
luck). No evidence was found to explain increases in overall CEO compensation 
(Cremers & Grinstein, 2014). Cremers and Grinstein ascribed these findings to 
consistency with theories of the CEO talent market and the argument of CEO talent 
competition. In contrast with Cremers and Grinstein’s study, Falato, Li, and Milbourn 
(2015) justified the link between the CEOs’ credentials, CEOs’ compensation, and 
performance of the firm by statistical analysis of data from the ExecuComp database with 
a sample of 2,195 cases of CEO succession from 1993 to 2005, although CEOs’ talent, by 
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its very nature, was difficult to quantify. The measurement of CEOs’ credentials referred 
to coded proxies on CEOs’ press coverage, trackable career records, and educational 
records (Falato et al., 2015). The regression analysis results were twofold: (a) new CEOs 
earned as much as 5% of total compensation premium per best decile of credential-
holders, of which were from CEOs with good credentials in relatively large firms; (b) 
CEOs with better credentials had significantly higher compensation in their first-year 
appointments (Falato et al., 2015). Also, the evidence revealed the presence of a 
relationship between CEOs’ credentials, CEOs’ compensation, and performance of the 
firm (Falato et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) identified compensation 
practices in the banking industry and the associated risks, where the CEOs’ cash bonuses 
might introduce the level of default bank risks. Vallascas and Hagendorff conducted a 
quantitative correlational study to investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms 
embedded in CEOs’ cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. The authors measured the 
bank risks via the Merton distance to default (DD) model, which is widely used in 
research and commercial applications (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013; Yeh, 2017). The 
DD model measures the default risk as the number of standard deviations the market 
value of bank assets lies above default point, which is the point where the market value of 
assets is less than the book value of total liabilities (Yeh, 2017). Vallascas and 
Hagendorff collected data from U.S. and European banks during the period of 1986–
2008. The results revealed no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk-reducing effect 
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when banks were financially distressed, or when banks operated under weak regulatory 
regimes (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013). 
Additional factors can affect executive compensation. The components of 
executive compensation are a combination of both short-term compensation (salary and 
bonuses) and long-term compensation, which typically consists of stock and shares (Cole 
& Mehran, 2016; Gabaix, Landier, & Sauvagat, 2014). Cole and Mehran briefly 
described the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance of the firm. 
The goal of an organization is to achieve maximum profit; shareholders and owners get 
financial benefits from this profit (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Managers or executives who 
are responsible for managing the firm normally focus on self-benefit rather than 
shareholders’ or organization interests (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Gabaix et al. suggested 
avoiding the issue of self-benefiting by providing attractive compensation and incentives 
to executives. For example, by increasing sales or production, executives might claim 
more compensation (Gabaix et al., 2014). Therefore, the relationship must depend on 
profit-compensation but not on the relationship between high sales or production and 
compensation (Cole & Mehran, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2014).  
Political and social factors also play important roles in executive compensation. 
Executives try to influence political factors to stabilize or increase their compensation 
(Cole & Mehran, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2014). Executives’ high salaries and the other 
compensation have an impact on the social environment because they lead to inequality 
in society because ordinary workers’ payments do not match the compensation of these 
executives (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Size of the firm has an impact on executive 
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compensation: small firms have a negative impact on executive compensation, whereas 
large firms had a positive impact on executive compensation (Gabaix et al., 2014).  
Tax reform policies influenced the tax system in terms of capital gains instead of 
executive income. Over time, stock options or share-based compensation have increased 
at high rates (Gorry, Hassett, Hubbard, & Mathur, 2017). Recent data and reliable 
information on stock-based compensation support estimates of an accurate and consistent 
relationship between management wealth and firm performance over the long term 
(Gorry et al., 2017). Share-based compensation is an essential part of contemporary 
compensation packages (Gorry et al., 2017). Long-term incentives should not increase, 
but stock or share-based compensation should decrease (Gorry et al., 2017). The need for 
uniform and clear pay practices for executives across the market segment emerged. 
Recent studies indicated that use of stock-based compensation practice has declined, but 
researchers suggested that the executive compensation value, which depends on share and 
market segments, has been increasing continuously (Gorry et al., 2017; Usman, Akhter, 
& Akhtar, 2015). 
Usman et al. (2015) studied the determinants of CEOs’ compensation with a 
partial least square (PLS) regression analysis to investigate the effectiveness of BODs on 
CEOs’ compensation structure using a sample of companies listed on the Karachi 
Pakistan Stock Exchange 100 from 2007 to 2011. Usman et al. used variance inflationary 
factor and bootstrapping techniques to verify the proposed model in PLS graph software. 
Fralich and Fan (2015) conducted a quantitative analysis to examine investors’ and 
executives’ different points of view of the contingency factors of executive compensation 
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to reduce agency costs. Their findings revealed CEOs’ social capital has greater 
importance to factors correlated with CEOs’ compensation, and little weight on human 
capital factors (Fralich & Fan, 2015). By contrast, the findings attached greater 
importance to human capital factors influencing executive compensation (Fralich & Fan, 
2015). However, Usman et al. failed to find any relationship between BODs’ 
effectiveness, CEOs’ compensation, and performance of firms; these results were the 
implications of the misalignment issue in agency theory. Conclusions of the study 
reflected the business environment in Pakistan, where businesses experience poor 
corporate governance and concentrated ownership (Usman et al., 2015). Usman et al. 
pointed out that their study had a different component of CEOs' total compensation, 
which did not include stock options. 
Executive compensation varies according to size of the firm, which could be 
determined by sales data, assets, and number of workers. Lin et al. (2013) examined the 
pay systems of companies that had suffered from fat cat problems of high pay for CEOs. 
They defined the fat cat problem as poor CEO performance coupled with high executive 
compensation (Lin et al., 2013). Lin et al. used sample data of 903 U.S.-based firms from 
2007 to 2010 and found a substitution effect between CEO compensation and the level of 
CEO ownership: larger firms granted higher pay to their CEOs. However, when Lin et al. 
limited the sample to only fat cat companies, they found a positive association between 
tenure and firm size with CEOs’ compensation. In addition, firm size, leverage ratio, and 
investment opportunities were significantly associated with total CEO compensation 
when the sample was limited to fat cat companies in the financial services industry (Lin 
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et al., 2013). Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2017), as well as Lin et al. focused on agency 
theory, who argued that excessive CEO pay was due to the power of executives over 
directors, which also allowed CEOs to set their own compensations and extract payment. 
CEOs who have abilities greater than those of average executives receive a larger 
compensation package (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). Managerial power occurs when the 
CEOs have the power to extract payment from an organization through direct influence 
over the board (Graham et al., 2012). Bebchuck et al. (2011) found that CEO influence 
over the board (managerial power) creates pay structures that compensation committees 
should control through total executive compensation practices and corporate governance. 
Specifically, if a CEO of an organization has enough power over governance to have an 
impact on the process of a compensation board when establishing a financial contract, 
then measuring pay-for-performance may not be an appropriate method through which to 
identify the variables, which make up executive compensation (Bebchuck et al., 2011). 
Seo, Tompkins, and Yi (2014) determined that to control the power of the CEO, the 
independence of BODs and compensation boards can prevent managers from extracting 
payments through higher compensation. 
Not all factors that determine executive compensation are financial in nature. 
Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) investigated the role of nonfinancial performance 
measures in executive compensation. O’Reilly, Caldwell, Chatman, and Doerr (2014) 
conducted a quantitative study to examine the relationships between CEOs’ personality, 
organizational culture, and performance of the firm. Jouber (2014) conducted a 
quantitative correlational study and found that CEO incentives could increase innovation 
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within corporations. Nulla (2013a) conducted a quantitative research to investigate the 
effect of CEOs’ age on CEOs’ compensation using accounting performance of the firm. 
Nulla used data from the S&P database from 2005 to 2010 targeting Canadian 
companies. 
Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) conducted a quantitative study to explore the 
relationship between nonfinancial measures for firms (for example, the passenger load 
factor) and CEOs’ cash compensation. They collected data from the EDGAR online 
database for 35 airline companies. Davila and Venkatachalam found the existence of a 
relationship between the passenger load factor and CEOs’ cash compensation based on 
results of the study. However, they found weak evidence that CEOs’ power and financial 
performance measures have an impact on the relationship between nonfinancial 
performance measures and cash compensation (Davila &Venkatachalam, 2004).  
O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al. (2014) conducted a correlational study using two sets of 
samples: 56 U.S. publicly traded firms in the technology industry and 44 privately held 
Irish firms. They first employed a factor analysis method to identify the organizational 
culture and its characteristics on both samples of data, and then tested the hypotheses of 
the study using the U.S. portion of the sample data (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). The 
measurement of the independent variable was from an organizational culture profile-
based Q-sort method containing statements such as fast-moving and being precise, as 
well as the Big Five model of CEO personality (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). The 
dependent variable was revenue and Tobin's Q, which reflect the present and future cash 
flows, respectively (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). Xing et al. (2017) argued that 
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Tobin’s Q, as a long-term performance indicator, was better for the purpose valuation 
than the traditional accounting terms such as ROE. O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al.’s findings 
indicated that CEOs’ personality has a positive effect on organizational culture, which in 
turn has an impact on performance of the firm. However, O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al. 
suggested further study of the relationships between CEOs’ personality, organizational 
culture, and performance of the firm based on more complex profiles. 
Innovation often improves in firms that employ more highly compensated CEOs, 
which is a positive change for organizational objectives (Laux, 2015). Jouber (2014) used 
a Pearson’s correlational design to examine the relationship between the interdependence 
of compensation incentives and firm innovation. Results of studies indicated that the type 
of incentive (stock options) a compensation committee uses correlates with firm 
innovation and growth (Chen, Chen, & Chu, 2014; Jouber, 2014). Specifically, Jouber 
found that recent awards and unvested options are more effective in incentivizing CEOs 
than previously awarded and vested options. Thus, compensation committees should 
continue to utilize stock options to align CEO incentives with those of shareholders 
(Chen, Chen, et al., 2014; Jouber, 2014).  
Executive compensation in financial crisis. With the early 2000s’ financial 
crisis and intense controversy over government bailouts of floundering companies, the 
question of executive compensation has again come to the fore of business discourse 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015; Vemala, Nguyen, Nguyen, & Kommasani, 
2014). The issue was complex; the AIG bonus scandal became a flashpoint for discussion 
about excessive executive compensation and the global economic crisis. AIG, however, 
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represented a special case of a company owned essentially by U.S. taxpayers who paid 
for executives’ bonuses (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). The fundamental principle 
was the same: high levels of executive compensation, if not translated into improved 
performance, were a drain on shareholder wealth (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). 
The financial crisis of 2008 exemplified the issue of the drain on shareholder 
wealth. The crisis had several different antecedents: reaction of the government to the 
savings and loan scandal; federal interest rate policies after the dot-com bubble burst; the 
creation and subsequent lack of oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (DeYoung et 
al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). A wide range of factors that contributed to the crisis of 2008 
made it difficult to gauge the impact of executive compensation accurately. However, 
executive compensation schemes played a role in the development of the crisis (DeYoung 
et al. 2013; Suárez, 2014).  
Flush with cash because of aggressive interest rate cuts by the federal government 
after the dot-com bubble burst, banks began to invest aggressively in consumer credit 
markets (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). This phenomenon manifested in an 
increase in subprime lending. Bank executives were willing to take this risk because they 
were confident that these activities would result in increased profits (Suárez, 2014). For a 
few years, banks recorded stellar profits and executives cashed in hundreds of millions of 
dollars in bonuses, options, and stock compensation (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 
2014). To ensure maximized profits and minimized risks were achieved, bank executives 
packaged their mortgages in mortgage-backed securities (Suárez, 2014). However, bank 
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executives advocated at the time that they were offloading some of these subprime loans 
(DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). 
Yang, Dolar, and Mo (2014) used a quantitative study to explore the relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance based on data of 3,286 different firms 
and 6,242 different CEOs from the S&P ExecuComp database. Their study was one of 
the very few studies that focused on the comparison of the pre- and post- financial crisis 
periods in 2007. Yang et al.’s study extended the dimension of similar studies. Yang et al. 
found that the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 
demonstrated different patterns between two periods. Based on these different patterns, 
they suggested that incentive-based contracts were not effective compensation tools in 
the aftermath of the crisis (Yang et al., 2014). Later, Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari (2015) used 
data from the Gindex to measure the dependent variable of corporate governance quality 
while using CEOs’ age, tenure, and ROE of firms as control variables. The results 
showed that CEO compensation was negatively related with a bank taking risks or 
becoming a failed institution, for the periods both before and during the financial crisis 
(Guo et al., 2015). 
Ultimately, executive compensation played only a minor role in the era of 
economic crisis (Yang et al., 2014). Bank executives, supplied with stock options, sought 
to increase profits. In doing so, they lowered their lending standards too much (DeYoung 
et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). The executives were not entirely culpable, though; the federal 
government gave them immoderate amount of money to lend (DeYoung et al., 2013; 
Suárez, 2014). Bank executives who did not lend the cash available to them were losing 
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money; bank executives were inevitably going to find ways to invest, and the demand 
was in the mortgage market (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). Stakeholders 
reasonably expected bank executives would have pursued such tactics regardless of the 
structure of their compensation packages, especially since they received guidance in that 
direction from the Federal Reserve (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). 
The controversy of executive compensation. Elson and Ferrere (2014) argued 
that excessive overcompensation departed from optimal market-based contracting, which 
originated from the mechanistic and arbitrary application of compensation peer group. 
They further pointed out the necessity of internal pay-setting systems to develop 
compensation standards based on the individual nature of the organization concerned, 
including the CEOs’ current and historical performance, and competitiveness exhibited 
by different industries, firms, and business environments (Elson & Ferrere, 2014). Elson 
and Ferrere addressed this problem in the context of corporate law, which was different 
from most of the work reviewed from an economic perspective. Elson and Ferrere 
stressed the importance of pointing out a practical solution to prevent overcompensation 
and to better regulate the CEOs. They emphasized the importance of incorporating the 
individual characteristics of CEOs (Elson & Ferrere, 2014). 
In part, the controversy can be traced to the poor optics that arose when 
executives made hundreds or thousands of times more than what their employees made. 
The question of an individual’s value was a fair one in this context; the defense was also 
reasonable (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015). The market forces of supply and 
demand drove the market for executive talent. Generous compensation packages are 
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essential for attracting top talent. Without top talent, the company would not meet its 
objectives (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015). The issue is also relevant to the 
study on corporate governance by Zhu and Westphal (2014). These studies revealed that 
no matter how much compensation an executive receives, the structure of the 
compensation should align with objectives of the executive team with those of the 
shareholders (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). 
On the other hand, scholars argued executive compensation could be too high and 
thus cause a significant burden. In 2006, a survey revealed that 81% of BODs voted that 
CEO pay was too high (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). The underlying premise is that executive 
pay should be linked to performance. In many cases, the designed constructs justify the 
case. The rise in equity-based compensation schemes was primarily due to the belief that 
if management had an ownership stake in the firm, the management actions would align 
with the other owners’ (shareholders’) objectives (Paz & Zaidi, 2014). The tax structure 
at the time—Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement (FASB) No.123—
supported the use of equity-based compensation by providing favorable tax status, which 
led to a proliferation of options-based compensation (Paz & Zaidi, 2014). The intent of 
options-based compensation was to resolve the agency problem, but ultimately it only 
added complexity to the agency problem (Chang, Hayes, & Hillegeist, 2015; Tosun, 
2016). In many firms, executives have enough control over their compensation to build in 




The objective was to align the interests of management with those of 
shareholders, but both options and executive contracts are finite (Cole & Mehran, 2016). 
Therefore, the best interests of the executive team were to maximize value in the short 
run, to the point of options expiry. So long as the options were in money at the expiry 
date, the executives would receive their compensation (Cole & Mehran, 2016). This 
argument created a short-term orientation for the executives; while any given shareholder 
might hold the security for the short run, the shareholders as a group existed in perpetuity 
(Cole & Mehran, 2016). Their interests were for long-term growth and profitability, 
which was not congruent with the short-term orientation created using options. Indeed, 
some of the major accounting scandals of the early 2000s were driven by this time 
orientation conflict (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Members of the FASB recognized the 
problem and amended the treatment of equity-based compensation with Statement 123R, 
although other firms did not need the FASB to make the call for them (Paz & Zaidi, 
2014). Companies such as Berkshire Hathaway have long-eschewed giant executive 
payouts; these companies have kept equity-based compensation focused on the long-term 
effects (Paz & Zaidi, 2014). 
If executives are ignorant of the timing and strike price of their options, they 
should be more inclined to pursue the interests of the company, which would lead these 
executives to have no sense of urgency to drive up earnings before an expiry date (Neron, 
2015). Executives might ultimately receive millions, which would depend strictly on 
performance. The temptation to fix earnings would disappear (Neron, 2015). On the other 
hand, an abundance of literature exists on the indication of executive compensation not 
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being competitive (Neron, 2015; Nickerson, 2017). The first argument that executive 
salaries were not too competitive is the free market argument; the market for executive 
talent is a free market, which is subject to the laws of demand and supply; the market 
participants might determine executive compensation (Nickerson, 2017). The factors that 
go into this calculation of worth vary, depending on the firm. For some firms, the BOD 
might believe it is essential to hire an experienced CEO. The CEO’s compensation, even 
if in the tens of millions, is a small fraction of what the CEO is worth to the bottom line 
of the firm (Neron, 2015; Nickerson, 2017). 
The free market argument could also be the cornerstone to refute the claims made 
by potential opponents. The gulf between workers’ salaries and executive salaries relates 
to the worth of each participant to the organization (Fang & Shi, 2016; O’Reilly, Doerr, 
Caldwell, & Chatman, 2014). A good CEO could be worth millions to the company and 
might not be easily replaced. The free market argument holds true in the Berkshire 
Hathaway argument, which implies that market participants determine the optimal CEO 
compensation (Fang & Shi, 2016; O’Reilly, Doerr, et al., 2014). 
Another argument is that executive talent must be well-compensated for attraction 
and retention. Such talent does take nonfinancial factors into consideration when 
choosing their employment situation, which is their prerogative (Giannetti & Metzger, 
2015). Executives should, as rational actors, extract the highest possible package of 
financial and nonfinancial compensation (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). A competitive 
environment could allow executives to receive their incentives (Giannetti & Metzger, 
2015). Again, the BOD of a company chooses to pay these salaries because the 
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opportunity costs of not paying them are deemed to be too high (Giannetti & Metzger, 
2015). The argument is that a properly constructed executive compensation plan will 
yield the desired results (Heron & Lie, 2017). Thus, the size of the compensation package 
will not determine the level of effectiveness; instead, the size of the compensation 
package will determine the structure of the package (Heron & Lie, 2017). Many firms 
have a high level of executive compensation matched by high performance. In most 
situations, scant publicity or outcry about the issue widely persists (Heron & Lie, 2017). 
Members of the BODs must answer to their shareholders. In many cases, if 
shareholders are institutions and do not receive a good return, then shareholders start 
replacing board members (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). The board, therefore, has a vested 
interest in attracting the type of talent that would keep the company competitive 
(Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). If executives’ compensation packages are not competitive, 
BODs risk their jobs in addition to the profits of the company (Giannetti & Metzger, 
2015). Previous studies have shown that the importance of acquisition of talent that is not 
expertise-specific to each position at best-performing companies (Neron, 2015; 
Nickerson, 2017). The highest performing companies build pools of talent from which 
they can draw, as needed (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). Thus, talented people are 
inevitably underutilized at times. Executives’ higher order needs are not always 
addressed. Thus, they must have a generous compensation, or when the time comes to 
move someone from the organization to a fulfilling higher order executive position, the 
talent would not be there (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). 
43 
 
CEO compensation proponents point out that the bulk of the CEOs’ excessive 
compensation comes in the form of stock or options (Heron & Lie, 2017; Sauset, Waller, 
& Wolff, 2015). Such instruments were introduced into executive compensation packages 
specifically to align the interests of management with those of shareholders (Heron & 
Lie, 2017). The shareholders and the BODs initiated the idea to protect shareholders’ 
wealth (Huang & Wang, 2015). As well, the instances in which executives have abused 
the compensation system occurred. However, those executives often found themselves 
being prosecuted. Awarding bonuses to the CEOs with poor performance is not a good 
practice. Evidence indicates that reducing executive compensation sends a red flag to 
investors, causing rapid erosion of shareholder wealth as the stock price dropped (Heron 
& Lie, 2017). Regulating or scrapping the entire system of executive compensation is 
unreasonable simply because some firms are not good at designing executive 
compensation plans (Heron & Lie, 2017). 
The free market philosophy underlays the beliefs of executive compensation not 
being too high. Advocates of the free market claimed that the market is irrational and 
favorable tax treatments encouraged equity-based compensation (Bolton, Mehran, & 
Shapiro 2015; Hitz & Müller-Bloch, 2015). By the time the tax treatment was changed, 
the concept had become standard practice; shareholders have only recently begun to 
exercise their rights in a meaningful way (Bolton et al., 2015). However, a handful of 
major institutional investors, such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement 




While the CalPERS and protesters from the Occupy Wall Street movement 
opposed high executive compensation on financial grounds, forming the basis of most 
objections to executive compensation levels was due to economic and social inequality 
(Keister, 2014). The social-stratification view stemmed from the notion of patterned 
principles, where a social order with more than the role of government was to pull levers 
of power to bring reality closer than just social order (Keister, 2014). Executives’ average 
compensations, as compared to those of workers, were high enough. Research showed 
the compensation—or payment gap—between the executives (CEOs or managers) and 
ordinary workers has increased rapidly every year (Shue & Townsend, 2017). Executives, 
as leaders of the workforce, play an important role in every organization and act as key 
members. They lead and manage the standards, processes, production, and quality control 
of an organization (Nickerson, 2017). The executives’ high compensation rates are 
understandable because of executives’ specific and crucial responsibilities (Nickerson, 
2017). As stated above, the growing compensation gap between the executives and 
workers is a fundamental factor of inequality, which influences the environment of 
society and produces negative impacts (Keister, 2014). 
Executives’ high compensation rates have an impact not only on the social 
environment of the countries in which their firms operate but also on the economy of 
those countries. The growing inequality is not just because of salary or wage differences, 
but also about the executive shares and stock in the organization (Gao, Luo, & Tang, 
2015). Executives also receive benefits in the form of allowances and bonuses. The BOD 
or the organization director invests too much to compensate the right person for the 
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executive-level job (Guo et al., 2015). The government could control the high 
compensation issue by implementing regulatory procedures and a more sophisticated tax 
system on such executive salary packages (Gao et al., 2015). The business community 
and executives usually consider regulations as government interference in business, 
which had a potential for yielding unstable factors to the government politically. 
Therefore, the executive compensation regulation system is not a good option to reduce 
or eliminate the inequality. On the other hand, taxation system could reduce the income 
inequality, and people could get benefits from the tax system (Gao et al., 2015). 
Disagreements about the impact of firm size on CEOs’ compensation and the 
relationship of firm size with CEOs’ total compensation occurred in the financial services 
industry (Lin et al., 2013). CEOs’ compensation relates not only to the size of firms, but 
also to the CEOs’ tenure, both of which contribute to the overall compensation (Lin et al., 
2013). However, evidence and research also indicated that while a relationship existed 
between firm size and CEO compensation, the relationship was sensitive to the period 
selected for the study (Banker et al., 2013). The reason being the existence of this 
relationship was not reported in research for the period from the 1940s to the early 1970s. 
To be consistent with previous studies, researchers reported that executive compensation 
was strongly and positively correlated with accounting returns (Banker et al., 2013; Lin et 
al., 2013). In addition, both accounting returns and market returns have a direct impact on 
executive compensation. Lin et al. found that regardless of the measurement of 
compensation (cash compensation only or total compensation), both accounting and 
market returns influenced executive compensation.  
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Executive compensation and firm performance. Hou, Lee, Stathopoulos, and 
Tong (2016) indicated that executive compensation structure could influence the 
development of enterprises, but the research findings vary widely. Moreover, different 
perspectives emerged on the variables and their influence factors on corporate 
performance (Hou et al., 2016). Most scholars advocated that the link between CEOs’ 
compensation and performance of firms would ease the conflicts between shareholders’ 
and executives’ interests and help solve the problem of agency. High compensation for 
CEOs could improve the profitability of the corporation, as represented in annual revenue 
of the firm (Graham et al. 2012).  
Hou et al. (2016) found the same result–equity compensation is helpful for 
motivating executives to create enterprise value. The authors discovered a strong 
correlation between executive remuneration and the market value of the firm (Hou et al., 
2016). Banker et al. (2013) also found positive effects of CEO compensation, and showed 
the managerial ownership has a positive incentive effect and could thus significantly 
improve operating performance of the company; in other words, a positive correlation 
exists between executive compensation structure and growth in annual revenue of the 
main business. Banker et al. performed a multiple linear regression analysis using ROE 
and individual stock performance as predictor variables, and CEOs’ salary, CEOs’ bonus, 
and CEOs’ equity compensation as criterion variables. They determined that from 1993 
through 2006, using data of 15,512 CEOs, ROE and stock performance of an individual 
firm had a positive association with both CEOs’ salary and CEOs’ equity-based 
compensation (Banker et al., 2013). 
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Gibbons and Murphy conducted a survey of the entrepreneurs of the top 500 
companies in Happy Magazine, and more than half of the survey participants indicated 
the financial index method was more appropriate than other methods for evaluating 
financial performance of firms (Graham et al., 2012). Empirical research of 367 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange revealed that accounting indexes are 
a commonly used method for evaluating the performance of entrepreneurs instead of 
stock returns (Graham et al., 2012). In addition, Lin et al. (2013) reported that firm size, 
as measured by total assets of a firm, has a significantly positive relationship with CEOs’ 
incentive compensation. Firm size is a measurement to differentiate the size of each firm 
by total assets of the firm (Lin et al., 2013). 
In recent years, many organizations have increased the proportion of stock options 
in executive compensation structure (Fralich & Fan, 2015). Regarding the proportion of 
shareholding, Fralich and Fan (2015) found a positive correlation between managers’ 
ownership and corporation performance. DeYoung et al. (2013) found that CEO 
compensation is significantly related to company characteristics, corporate governance 
mechanism, and other factors. In private enterprises and foreign investment holding 
companies, annual executive remuneration has a significant correlation with the annual 
revenue (DeYoung et al., 2013). 
Scholars have found that executive compensation structure is closely related to 
the performance of corporations (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). Some researchers have 
carried out relevant empirical research on the mutual relationships of executive basic 
salary, bonuses, benefits, risks, and income. According to Cooper, Gulen, and Rau 
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(2016), the difficulty of distinguishing between the business performance and fixed salary 
might equate to a greater value in the compensation structure. If the shareholding ratio of 
CEOs was high, the cash reward would be relatively low (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). 
Individual ownership would replace the salary incentive, and there would be a negative 
correlation between incentive compensation and executive ownership (Cooper et al., 
2016). Increased executive ownership could help coordinate the interests between 
executives and owners, and potentially reduce the agency costs (Chakravarty & Grewal, 
2016).  
Nulla (2013a) used independent variables of ROE and annual revenue, and the 
dependent variable of CEOs’ total compensation in the study. The results indicated the 
existence of a positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO age, using 
accounting performance as a benchmark (Nulla, 2013a). Graham et al. (2012) contributed 
to the study of executive compensation by modeling the fixed effect of managers, which 
refers to the heterogeneity of the managerial talents and human capital. Therefore, the 
model may explain some of the high levels of executive compensations. Graham et al. 
suggested that executives with high compensation and increased corporate performance 
are identified to be highly aligned. Furthermore, Graham et al. found that managers with 
a higher than expected level of compensation would take measures to prevent losing their 
jobs and the excess compensation by choosing lower leverage. The authors pointed out 




Brisker and Wang (2017) used a quantitative correlational design to explore the 
relationship between CEOs’ deferred compensation, capital structure of the firm, and 
firm performance. They used the deferred compensation data set to measure CEOs’ 
aversion to risk. Brisker and Wang also provided firsthand evidence of the relationship 
between CEO risk preferences and firm risk, such as stock return volatility, earnings 
volatility, and the riskiness of financial and investment policies. The results indicated that 
risk-taking CEOs pursue risky financial and investment firm policies, based on the 
behavioral consistency theory to demonstrate that CEOs act consistency across personal 
and professional situations (Brisker & Wang, 2017). Meanwhile, Alves, Couto, and 
Francisco (2016) used a quantitative correlational method to examine the link between 
CEOs’ compensation and characteristic of firms, including shareholders' return, and 
stakeholders' characteristics. Alves et al. used a unique, hand-collected data set of 450 
Portuguese companies listed on the Portugal Stock Exchange for the period of 2002–
2011. The dependent variable was the log of CEO earnings, while the independent 
variables included the log of assets, dividend yield, CEO age, CEO tenure, stock 
earnings, and so on (Alves et al., 2016). Alves et al. used the ordinary least squares 
regression analysis at the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, resulting in some 
variables losing statistical significance. The results indicated that, in comparison with the 
previous research findings for CEOs in other countries, CEO earnings in Portugal were at 
the consistent level (Alves et al., 2016).  
Alves et al. (2016) also found that CEO earnings were higher in large firms, 
which yielded a higher level of dividend. Higher CEO age drove the earnings up; CEOs 
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with higher education levels had lower earnings (Alves et al., 2016; Falato et al, 2015). 
Regarding the characteristics of BODs, the larger the compensation and governance 
committee is, where more foreign directors included, the higher earnings CEOs receive 
(Alves et al., 2016). However, firms in which the CEOs who also served as chairmen of 
BODs received lower earnings, while larger size of the board and more independent 
directors involved. Alves et al. suggested and validated the linkage between CEOs’ 
compensation and characteristics of the firm, based on the new insights to determinants 
of CEOs’ earnings. 
Zou, Zeng, Lin, and Xie (2015) conducted an empirical investigation of the 
relationship between top executives’ compensation and environmental performance in 
China. The result indicated that best-performing executives’ cash compensation has a 
positive relation with company environmental performance, whereas equity ownership 
has a negative relation with company environmental performance (Zou et al., 2015). The 
results also showed that, in these relationships, the competition played a moderating role. 
In more competitive industries, pay and ownership have stronger relationships with 
environmental performance (Zou et al., 2015). Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017) 
examined the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms based 
on data of large European firms from 2009 to 2013. The results suggested that company 
market efficiency has a high intercorrelation with CEOs’ compensation (Smirnova & 
Zavertiaeva, 2017). Accounting-based performance, such as ROA, was found to have a 
correlation with the cash and bonus portions of CEOs’ compensation, while incentive 
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compensation might have an association with performance of the firm (Smirnova & 
Zavertiaeva, 2017).  
However, some scholars also opined that executive compensation is negatively 
correlated with business growth of the firm (Banker et al., 2013). Banker et al. found 
ROE is negatively related to a CEO’s bonus. Banker et al. also concluded that the bonus 
has a negative relationship to past performance. Compensation committees should 
evaluate the use of salary and bonuses and ensure that each method of compensation 
aligns with the performance of the firm (Chen, Chen, et al, 2014; Veliyath et al., 2016). 
Often, the size of a BOD also has relevance as BOD size is related to risk-taking choices 
within a firm (Huang & Wang, 2015). Huang and Wang determined that smaller BODs 
increased the risk-taking behavior of chief executives through the larger incentives in 
their compensation. Huang and Wang also concluded that CEOs working with the 
oversight of smaller BODs would elect less leverage (debt), but would take on higher risk 
in projects than those CEOs who had the oversight of a larger BOD. CEO tenure was 
used as a measurement of the number of years a CEO has held his or her position (Lin et 
al., 2013). 
In addition, Kim, Kogut, and Yang (2015) analyzed the drastic shift of income 
inequality in the United States and blamed executive compensation for being the primary 
source. They proposed three potential explanations, including interlocking directorates, 
peer groups, and educational networks (Kim et al., 2015). Kim et al. failed to find 
supporting statistical evidence of the explanatory power of peer and education network 
on excessively high executive compensation. Therefore, managerial talent could not be 
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the major source of rapid growth of executive compensations, which were growing faster 
than the market valuation or size of the firm (Kim et al., 2015). The only justified 
explanation of their statistical analysis was corporate director networks (Withisuphakorn 
& Jiraporn, 2017). Namely, it was the power of executives and interlocking directorates 
to blame for the speedy growth of executive compensations (Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 
2017). 
Jenter and Kanaan (2015) found similar results as to the study of Kim et al. 
(2015). Jenter and Kanaan examined the probability of CEO dismissal against corporate 
performance by using the hand-collected data over the period of 1993–2009. The results 
suggested that CEOs were more likely to have dismissals in a market downturn than 
during a boom period, which was an exogenous factor beyond the CEOs’ control (Jenter 
& Kanaan, 2015). Jenter and Kanaan proposed the explanation that performance in a 
recession was more indicative of managerial ability and quality of the firm-CEO match. 
The implication of this literature was to use relative performance measures such as 
benchmark performance against peer performance, or value-weighted industry or market 
performance (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).  
The researchers asserted that CEOs’ turnover should be an extreme case of pay-
for-performance because peer performance affected not only compensation, but also 
CEOs’ turnover (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Even though Jenter and Kanaan pointed out 
that CEO compensation can lead to innovation, Brisker et al. (2014) concluded that it can 
lead to less risk taking, which can also be detrimental. Another concern regarding 
incentives paid through stock options was the unintended consequence of creating risk 
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aversion for the CEO (Brisker et al., 2014). Risk aversion could occur if the CEO has 
most of his or her wealth concentrated in stock options and thus tied to the value of the 
firm (Brisker et al., 2014; Heron & Lie, 2017). CEOs in a situation with wealth tied 
directly to the firm value may be hesitant and reject positive net present value projects, 
which were too risky (Heron & Lie, 2017). 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) used a quantitative study to examine the 
relationship between an important organizational feature, the structure of managerial 
compensation, and value-critical managerial decisions—specifically, the relationship 
between managerial compensation, investment policy, debt policy, and firm risks. They 
used the S&P ExecuComp database to collect data of selected CEOs (Coles et al., 2006). 
However, Coles et al. did not identify the conceptual framework on which they based the 
test; they concluded that higher sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to stock volatility (vega) 
implements riskier policy choices. Coles et al. also found that riskier policy choices lead 
to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock return volatility was 
found to have a positive effect on both vega and delta (Coles et al., 2006). 
Similar to Coles et al. (2006)’s study, Brisker et al. (2014) empirically examined 
whether CEOs had the incentive to time the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) when they 
thought the stock price was overvalued in the market while they held high equity-based 
compensation. They found that the firms with that kind of CEOs would experience 
abnormally low stock returns and relatively low operating performance in the 3-year 
period following the SEOs (Brisker et al., 2014). The authors concluded that CEOs with a 
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high level of equity-based compensation was self-motivated by timing SEOs when stocks 
were overpriced (Brisker et al., 2014).  
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) investigated the relationship between CEO 
pay slice (CPS) and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The results 
were based on data collected from the Compustat and ExecuComp databases for the 
period of 1993–2004, using regression analysis with control variables and correlation 
analysis (Bebchuk et al., 2011). Bebchuk et al. determined that CPS has a negative 
impact on firm value, as well as negative correlation against accounting profitability, 
stock return accompanying acquisitions, performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and 
stock market return. Moreover, CPS has an association with higher odds of lucky grants 
with low prices for CEOs. Higher CPS would lead to a series of risks and further impact 
corporate performance (Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 2017). Higher CPS represents 
CEOs’ superior power over the boards, as well as greater extent for CEOs to extract 
payment, which was still in line with the argument in the framework of agency theory 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 2017).  
Shim and Kim (2015) conducted Pearson’s correlation and ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression to test the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate 
performance; the results indicated that market-based performance measures are strongly 
correlated with CEO compensation in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act period. Results 
of research by Cooper et al. (2016) indicated that corporate performance has no 
correlation with executive compensation. Cooper et al. also had different explanations for 
the causes of no correlation between executive compensation and firm growth. However, 
55 
 
accounting-based performance measures correlated positively with CEO compensation in 
the post-SOX period. The results indicated that the SOX Act played a vital role in 
explaining changes in the relationship between performance expectations of firms and 
CEOs’ compensation (Shim & Kim, 2015). In brief, results of much research have 
revealed that executive compensation structure has a significant influence on executive 
behavior and a strong incentive effect on business growth.  
Executive compensation in the banking industry. Studies have shown the 
unique characteristics of the banking sector that make the nature of CEOs’ compensation 
unlike that of other industries (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015; Leventis, Dimitropoulos, & 
Owusu-Ansah, 2013; Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017; Nguyen, Nguyen, & Yin, 2015). 
Leventis et al. conducted a quantitative correlational study to examine the relationship 
between the corporate governance and the performance (with accounting conservatism) 
of banks. The authors discussed the importance of having an effective corporate 
governance to banking corporations due to the information asymmetry (Nguyen et al., 
2015). Levantis et al. identified executive compensation as a major component of 
corporate governance while using earnings per share and the buy-and-hold stock return as 
the variables of measurement to financial performance. The authors selected 421 publicly 
listed commercial banks in the United States; during the sample period of 2003–2009, 
where 47% of banks from the sample reported a negative stock return in a given year 
(Leventis et al., 2013). Using a Pearson’s pairwise correlation test for data analysis, 
Leventis et al. found banks with better incentives for management did not necessarily 
perform well in terms of stock return and earnings. However, Leventis et al. also found 
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that banking CEOs received high compensation levels for boosting the financial 
performance of their firms. The authors suggested that BODs of banks should engage in 
the practice of conservatism to reduce financial risks (Leventis et al., 2013).  
Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) measured the corporate performance from two 
periods: before the financial crisis (2005–2006) and during the financial crisis (2007–
2008). Cerasi and Oliviero studied the relationship between CEOs’ financial incentives 
and the volatility of performance by banks during the financial crisis. In a similar study, 
Liu et al. (2017) observed how executive compensation changes might relate to corporate 
governance by using a sample of 214 U.S. banking mergers from the Thomson ONE 
Banker database. Cerasi and Oliviero divided the performance measurements into two 
different groups: one group included ROA, market return from stock prices, capital ratio, 
book value, and total assets for 2005–2006; the other group was buy-and-hold return and 
its standard deviation for 2007–2008. The authors employed new data sources combined 
from Bankscope and S&P Capital IQ-People Intelligence databases for 116 large banks 
worldwide (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). Results of regression analysis revealed that banks 
with better CEOs' financial incentives had higher volatility, lower buy-and-hold returns 
amid the crisis, and higher Tobin’s Q before the crisis (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). The 
implication was that the relationship between two variables could be dynamic and vary 
over time (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015).  
To measure CEOs’ compensation, Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) applied the 
definitions that consisted of variables of cash bonus over salary, equity bonus over salary, 
total bonus over salary, and value of total compensation. They found a lack of evidence 
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for a relation between CEOs' compensation and performance of firms from the sample 
data (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). However, Liu et al. (2017) initially obtained a sample 
size of 478, from which they reduced the sample size by applying certain criteria such as 
whether the deal was closed between the years 1995–2012, whether bidder and target 
firm were commercial banks. For CEO compensation, the authors collected data 
manually from financial statements that were available from the SEC EDGAR website 
(Liu et al., 2017).  
Liu et al. (2017) developed hypotheses based whether CEOs’ compensation is at 
an optimal level when changes in compensation have a positive relationship with 
performance of the firm, which was not affected by the articulation of corporate 
governance. A corporate governance index (CGI) contains a set of variables that measure 
the wellness of overall corporate governance (Iqbal & Javed, 2017; Liu et al., 2017). The 
authors found that CGI increased throughout the time span; however, the differences 
between the sample period of 2004–2012 and 1995–2003 had a statistical significance of 
the mean values of CGI (Liu et al., 2017). Such a result coincided with the introduction 
of the SOX Act in 2002 (Liu et al., 2017; Shim & Kim, 2015). By using a series of 
regression analyses, Liu et al. concluded that changes in CEOs’ salary for bank mergers 
had a positive relationship with the performance of bidding banks, and that this 
performance did not have a relationship with the CGI. Liu et al. stated that being satisfied 
with the optimal contracting hypothesis, meaning the banking CEO compensation 
settings aligned with shareholders' interests. Likewise, changes to CEOs' cash bonus for 
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bank mergers had a negative relationship with the firms' performance, which was clearly 
influence by the CGI (Liu et al., 2017). 
In contrast to pay-for-performance sensitivity, DeYoung et al. (2013) studied pay-
risk sensitivity, namely the change of CEOs’ compensation against stock volatility. Guo 
et al. (2015) investigated whether CEOs’ compensation composition played a role in 
promoting risk-taking behaviors in the banking industry. Prager (2014) examined the 
relationship between risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in 
the context of financial regulation. Guo et al. conducted a quantitative regression study to 
examine how CEO compensation composition relates to the incentive of banks for risk 
taking. The study was also about the examination of the relationship between banking 
CEOs’ compensation and changes in risk-taking opportunities before and during the 
financial crisis (Guo et al., 2015).  
DeYoung et al. (2013) justified the link between risk-taking incentives to 
financially risky business policies. Banking CEOs were not only aware of the risk-taking 
behaviors, but also acted in response to the incentives of their commercial contracts. 
DeYoung et al. also pointed out the bank boards were monitoring the risk outcomes by 
adjusting proper compensation contracts, especially for those banks with a large 
proportion of income from nontraditional activities. The authors grasped the unique 
characteristics of the banking sector and the implied incentives in contract, which, 
although not be a quantitative measurement, might have played an important role in 




Guo et al. (2015) collected data from the ExecuComp database for top executives' 
compensation and from the Bankscope database for financial statements, respectively, for 
a sample of publicly traded banking companies between 1992 and 2008 (before and 
during the financial crisis). The measurement of the independent variable of total 
compensation was the maximum of the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan 
payouts, other annual, restricted stock grants, and all other value of option grants (Guo et 
al., 2015). As well, Prager (2014) proposed to answer the questions that emerged during 
the financial crisis and pointed out that financial firms should be different from 
nonfinancial firms. Prager summarized previous studies and results by conducting a 
literature review study to answer the question of whether misaligned incentive and 
mismanagement existed for investment banks, mortgage funding corporations, and other 
credit rating agencies. Prager collected sample data of literature for U.S. and European 
banks and found that banks in which the chief risk officer (CRO) reported to the board 
rather than to CEO would have higher stock returns and ROE during the financial crisis. 
Therefore, they concluded that CROs might be able to perform their jobs to restrain 
CEOs from taking risky actions (Prager, 2014). 
Transition 
In Section 1, I presented the problem underlying the intended study. Also 
presented were the purpose of the intended study, the nature of the intended study, the 
research question, hypotheses, the theoretical framework, the operational definitions, the 
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, implications for social change, and a review 
of the professional and academic literature. Results of the literature review indicated the 
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need for the present study, the purpose of which was to examine the existence of a 
predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options).  
In Section 2, I discuss the project, which includes a restatement of the problem, 
the role of the researcher, the participants, the research method and design, the population 
and sampling, ethical considerations, instrumentation, data collection technique, data 
analysis process, and the study validity. In Section 3, I present the data analysis results, 
application to business practice, implication to social change, recommendations for future 
studies, and reflections. 
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Section 2: The Project 
This section includes an overview of the methodology and design used in this 
study. I discuss the selection and justification of the research method and design in detail. 
I also present the (a) role of the research, (b) research participants, (c) instrumentation 
used for data collection, (d) consideration of ethical research, (e) techniques of data 
collection, and (f) data analysis procedures. I conclude this section by addressing the 
threats to study validity. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive 
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options). 
The independent variables (predictors) were ROE of the firm and annual revenue the 
firm. The dependent variable (criterion) was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for 
U.S. publicly traded banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify both the predictor 
variables and the criterion variable. Data were available in firm-year format. 
This study may contribute to social change by providing new information that can 
assist individuals on BODs when making decisions to incentivize CEOs, such as 
including various types of bonuses in CEOs’ compensation packages. Misalignment 
between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms may be of concern to the public 
(Nulla, 2013b). However, the general public and the other stakeholders might have 
limited awareness about the extent to which such a misalignment might have a negative 
impact on the financial performance of firms. This study could lead BODs to a better 
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understanding of how firms’ financial performance should affect CEOs’ compensation, 
which may contribute to improved public perception. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as a researcher in the data collection process of this quantitative 
correlational study was to ensure careful selection of data sources and the validity of 
study results. I had to ensure that data from publicly available sources used in this study 
were collected in a reliable and valid manner. My research role also encompassed data 
analysis of the final data sets. Bozkurt, Akgun-Ozbek, and Zawacki-Richter (2017) 
reviewed previous studies and concluded that researchers can be learners or observers 
who draw and present conclusions from the synthesis of data and previous findings. Brett 
et al. (2014) summarized the researchers’ role as ensuring that the research conducted has 
high quality by analyzing relevant scientific data in detail and with care. 
Roulston and Shelton (2015) stated that researchers must be objective, neutral, 
and impartial in the research process. To ensure that researchers do not introduce 
personal biases affecting statistical analysis, researchers must be able to state the 
perspective of participants before undertaking the data collection (Coburn & Penuel, 
2016). My relationship with the topic of the study was intentional because I demonstrated 
great interest in quantitative correlational studies. I accessed archives of the S&P 
ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases, which were publicly available data. My 
relationship with participants was neutral and independent. I targeted the U.S. banking 
industry because of the interests from the identified gaps in the literature review and my 
previous work inside of it. 
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While the role of the researcher is to initialize the review process and avoid 
potential ethical dilemmas in the research (Page & Nyeboer, 2017), members of 
institutional review boards (IRB) ensure that research conforms with practices, protocols, 
and other regulatory aspects articulated in the Belmont Report, which contains a summary 
of basic ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects (Fiske & 
Hauser, 2014). The Belmont Report includes the principles of respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice (Fiske & Hauser, 2014). These principles have led researchers to 
apply for following requirements: (a) informed consent, (b) risk and benefits analysis, 
and (c) selection of subjects (Friesen, Kearns, Redman, & Caplan, 2017; Jones & 
McCullough, 2015). These guidelines and applications did not apply to this study because 
I did not involve human subjects in my research. 
Participants 
For this study, I used archival data sources throughout and did not make use of 
human subjects. Cornelissen (2016) asserted that using secondary data analysis ensures 
not only the generalizability of findings but also the likelihood of decreasing ethical risks. 
The use of archival data was the most appropriate method for addressing the research 
questions for this study. Johnston (2014) suggested that researchers should select the 
appropriate data collection method that may save time, effort, and resources. All data 
were sourced from the archives of S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases, 
which were publicly available. Moore (2014) also conducted research using archival data 
in the U.S. health services industry. I did not need to create any strategies for gaining 
permission to access the data used in this study (see Appendix C). 
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Archival Data of Compensation 
The S&P ExecuComp database was the source for data on CEO compensation. 
The S&P ExecuComp database contains annual compensation data on the top five 
executive officers of all S&P 1000 companies since 1992; these records represent more 
than 3,300 companies and data on 39,000 executives (Gillan, Hartzell, Koch, & Starks, 
2017). Executive data consist of compensation information, such as salary, cash bonuses, 
stock options, and other bonuses (Gillan et al., 2017). In this study, I targeted only CEOs’ 
compensation data of commercial banking companies—SIC 6020. 
The S&P ExecuComp database is an accurate and unbiased collection of 
executive compensation data sourced from proxy statements of annual reports for 
included firms (Gillan et al., 2017). Mathuva (2014) argued that although researchers 
have raised concerns about the reliability of these archival data, the financial data reports 
have gone through the audit and validation process to attest to their reliability. The S&P 
ExecuComp is popular in published research (Gillan et al., 2017). Falato et al. (2015) 
conducted research to examine the relationship between the financial performance of 
firms, CEOs’ skills, and CEOs’ compensation by using archival data from the S&P 
ExecuComp database. Guo et al. (2015) also conducted a quantitative regression analysis, 
using the S&P data, to determine the extent to which salaries, cash bonuses, and long-
term incentives of executives were related to corporates’ risk-taking activities. Based on 
this research, I concluded that the archival data from the S&P ExecuComp database are 
an accurate representation of CEOs’ compensation, which was the criterion variable in 
the present study.  
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Archival Data of Financial Performance 
The S&P Compustat database was the source of information on ROE and annual 
revenue of companies. The S&P Compustat database is a resource financial, statistical 
and market information on companies’ performance worldwide, which has wide usage in 
research. (Casey, Gao, Kirschenheiter, Li, & Pandit, 2015; Chen & Waters, 2017). 
Bragaw and Misangyi (2017) examined the relationship between CEOs’ prior 
experiences, initial compensation, and market-based performance of firms using archival 
data from the S&P Compustat database. The S&P Compustat database contains 
information sourced from the financial statements of publicly traded companies (Casey et 
al., 2015). Johnston (2014) stated that data from financial reports are reliable due to the 
auditing and validating processes of those publicly traded firms. Financial reporting 
indices were the best representation of financial performance of firms (Melitski, & 
Manoharan, 2014). ROE and annual revenue were predictor variables derived from the 
research question of this study. Therefore, I used archival data from the S&P Compustat 
database to address the research question. 
Research Method and Design 
Research Method 
I relied on quantitative methodology to address the research question. This 
approach was appropriate for the study because the study involved testing the existence 
of a relationship between two sets of variables. Quantitative method is a type of empirical 
research for testing statistical hypotheses under the framework of a theory (Trafimow, 
2014). This study also involved claims (hypotheses), which consisted of variables. 
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Quantitative method concerns the development of hypotheses and testing hypotheses 
(Choy, 2014). Variables should be measurable using numbers and analyzable with 
statistical techniques (Ingham-Broomfield, 2014).  
A qualitative approach was not appropriate for the study because qualitative 
research focuses on establishing a theory, a definition, or the understanding of a 
phenomenon (Cho & Lee, 2014). Qualitative method also involves different approaches 
regarding data analysis process; typically, qualitative researchers convert data into 
themes or patterns for analysis (Daigneault, 2014). Finally, the qualitative research 
method was not suitable for analyzing or testing the relationship between numerically 
valued variables (Sandelowski, 2014). 
A mixed-methods approach was also not appropriate for this study. Mixed-
methods research combines both qualitative and quantitative aspects into understanding 
and verifying complex phenomena (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). The mixed methods 
rely on quantitative data to yield statistical results, which in turn leads to the development 
of specific follow-up questions for in-depth understanding of the process and underlying 
relationship (Birchall et al., 2016). In addition, some researchers argued that the mixed 
methods provide increased accuracy for the study (Özdemir & Adan, 2014). However, 
this study did not have the need for understanding a phenomenon. 
Research Design 
A correlational design was the most suitable approach for this study. The focus of 
the study was on the examination of the relationship between variables. Quantitative 
researchers measure two or more sets of variables and use findings of correlational design 
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to determine the relationship between variables (Curtis, Comiskey, & Dempsey, 2016). 
The correlational design involves using natural and continuous variables from the 
interested population, where no manipulation of the variable is necessary (Rucker, 
McShane, & Preacher, 2015). Alves et al. (2016) conducted research using correlational 
design to examine the relationship between dependent variables and independent 
variables. Hence, the correlational design was suitable for the study. 
The traditional experimental design was not appropriate for this study. First, the 
experimental design is best for studying the main effects and interactions between more 
sets of process variables or factors (Barka et al., 2014). Second, the experimental design 
often involves the manipulation of variables to understand how changes in one variable 
affect other variables (Rucker et al., 2015). Finally, researchers conduct scientific 
experimental design to find the optimal values of variables, rather than finding the 
relationship between variables (Callao, 2014). The purposes of employing an 
experimental design exceeded the scope for this study.  
The quasi-experimental design was also not appropriate for this study. Quasi-
experimental designs are unlike experimental designs that test the causal consequences of 
treatments outside of the laboratory (Cook, 2015). Furthermore, quasi-experimental 
design does not fulfill the requirement of this study to test the relationship between 
variables. This quantitative design was concerned with yielding insights on the short-term 
results that need follow-up, as well as publication biases (Irvin & Kaplan, 2014). 
Therefore, the correlational design was the only suitable one for addressing the research 
question and testing hypotheses of the study. 
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Population and Sampling 
The general population of this study was archival data of CEOs’ compensation, 
ROE, and annual revenue, from all publically traded commercial banks with a SIC code 
of 6020, including SIC codes of 6021 (national commercial banks), 6022 (state 
commercial banks), and 6029 (commercial banks, not elsewhere classified) located 
within the United States. I designated this population because the research question was 
to discover whether a predictive relationship exists between ROE of a firm, annual 
revenue of a firm, and CEO’s compensation. The population of a study should logically 
stem from the research question of the study, as well as a sampling plan (Palinkas et al., 
2015). Palinkas et al. also stated that quantitative study emphasizes the generality of 
knowledge is the representative of the population. 
The randomly selected samples were from archival data of U.S.-based publicly 
traded commercial banks. This sampling method was a probabilistic simple random 
procedure. First, the sample of population should be randomized (probabilistic) because 
the sampling must have representativeness of the population (Anderson et al., 2015). 
Second, employing such a sampling method was a feasible and efficient data collection 
process. Duan, Bhaumik, Palinkas, and Hoagwood (2015) alleged that convenience 
sampling may achieve the maximum effectiveness of limited resources. However, 
Peterson and Merunka (2014) argued that statistical inferences using a convenience 
sample would cause a limitation to generalize results to a different population, which 
meant the study would have limited reproducibility. Probabilistic sampling was optimal 
because the research results could extend the generalization (Kandola, Banner, O'Keefe-
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McCarthy, & Jassal, 2014). Third, random sampling ensures that every member of the 
population has an equal opportunity to be selected (Emerson, 2015). I used computer-
generated random numbers assigned to members of the population for sampling in this 
study. 
The simple random sampling technique has both its strengths and weaknesses. For 
instance, this approach has the benefit of requiring minimal knowledge of the target 
population (Kandola et al., 2014). Kandola et al. further concluded that using simple 
random sampling can achieve high internal and external validity. On the other hand, the 
downside of using such a method can be (a) high cost, (b) requiring a sampling frame, or 
(c) introducing large sampling errors (Kandola et al., 2014). Therefore, researchers 
should take the size of samples into considerations to ensure the generalizability of the 
research, as well as balance the use of resources for their research (Anderson et al., 
2015). 
In this study, I used G*Power (Version 3.1.9.2) to calculate the sample size. 
G*Power is a free and stand-alone computer program, which researchers commonly use 
to perform statistical power analysis and tests in social and behavioral research 
(Macfarlane et al., 2015). G*Power Version 3.1 provided enhancements to previous 
versions and included procedures for correlation and regression analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2009). Specifically, researchers use a priori power analysis to estimate 
the sample size before conducting the research (Walum, Waldman, & Young, 2016). In 
the research planning phase, researchers must anticipate an effect size (the strength of 
correlation) to estimate the sample size for a given power level (1- β) and significance 
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level (α). Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) explained that a small effect size would lead to 
the requirement of a large sample size to reach a certain statistical significance level, 
whereas a large effect size leads to small sample size. Walum et al. also suggested using a 
standardized Cohen’s effect sizes (of 0.1 = small, 0.3 = medium, and 0.5 = large) or a 
reference from the literature reviews. 
I conducted a priori power analysis using the following values to calculate the 
sample size: α = 0.05; power (1- β) = 0.95; and anticipated effect size = 0.2. The result of 
the calculation was 81 for the required sample size. Bosco et al. (2015) argued that the 
benchmarks for effect size had an update of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 for small, medium, and 
large, respectively. Bosco et al. further observed different correlational studies with the 
effect size ranging from 0.10 to 0.80 and concluded that the distribution of effect size 
exhibited a mapping to Cohen’s benchmarks. Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) further 
asserted that researchers had a difficulty in determining an accurate effect size and 
suggested selecting an effect size between 0.2 and 0.8. I also reviewed other doctoral 
studies from both Walden and other universities to get an idea of how these researchers 
decided on an effect size value. Moore (2014) conducted the study with a value of effect 
size at 0.498 and suggested using a larger sample size to address an outstanding 
generalizability. Heron (2015) studied the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and 
financial performance of firms with an effect size of 0.35 to be able to reject the null 
hypothesis, resulting in support of the hypothesis of the existence on a positive 
relationship between CEO’s compensation and financial performance of the firm. 
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Ethical Research  
All data in this analysis were publicly available, historical data from archival 
sources. Johnston (2014) suggested that using existing data sets could save time and 
accelerate the pace of research, provided the same content from the original data 
collection was available. However, Cho et al. (2015) pointed out that the existing 
regulation also allowed the researchers to alter or waive the informed consent when the 
research involved no more than minimal risks to human subjects. Dolan (2015) 
emphasized that researchers must invoke the informed consent process when conducting 
research on human subjects. The participants of this study included archived data sets that 
were publicly available, rather than human subjects. As such, an informed consent 
process was not applicable. However, the Walden University IRB needed to review and 
approve the application before the data collection process could commence (see 
Appendix B). The IRB approval number for the study was 08-03-17-0454701. 
Ethical researchers must demonstrate receptiveness, openness, and fairness to 
participating human subjects regarding acquisition of informed consents (Simon, Klein, 
& Schartz, 2014). Practically, offering an incentive to nudge participants to making their 
judgments is not ethically protective of personal autonomy (Ploug & Holm, 2015). 
Additionally, the data collection process did not include human subjects; therefore, 
concerns related to incentives for participants was also not applicable.  
Linder, Elek, and Calderon (2014) raised concerns regarding the ethical challenge 
of maintaining confidentiality or anonymity of participants. Because participants of this 
study were publicly available data, I did not need to intentionally protect organizations by 
72 
 
excluding the identity information in any part of the study. Data used in this analysis 
were stored on an internal hard drive of a password-protected computer during the study 
period. These data were transferred to a flash drive and continued to be stored for 5 years, 
after which time I will physically destroy the flash drive. 
Instrumentation 
In this study, I relied on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet as the instrumentation for 
comparing, filtering, storing, and processing raw data. The version of Microsoft Excel 
was 2016 through a Microsoft Office 365 subscription. This instrumentation was suitable 
for the study because variables and their measurements were numerical formats, which 
could be easily managed and processed by the instrument. Omair (2015) discussed and 
emphasized the importance of using numerical data because the essence of quantitative 
research is to test hypotheses. Guetterman et al. (2015) suggested collecting data with a 
series of scales for quantitative studies.  
This instrument was a widely available product, which I did not have to acquire 
access permission to use it for the research (see Appendix C). Ingham-Broomfield (2014) 
noted that researchers should realize appropriateness of the research design regarding the 
use of or further developing an effective research instrument. Heale and Twycross (2015) 
asserted that researchers must assess the validity of the instrument to ensure it measures 
what it is supposed to measure if the researchers use an existing instrument. The 
reliability of the instrument reflects the research quality, which relates to the stability and 
consistency of the instrument (Heale & Twycross, 2015). In this study, I did not have any 
difficulties in neither making sure of the validity of the instrument nor adjusting the 
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research instrument, because data sources had the same format as the instrument 
(delivered as .csv or .xls files). Also, I did not have any concerns with the reliability of 
the instrument because I collected archival data. 
The concepts measured by the instrument were CEOs’ total compensation 
(including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options), ROE, and 
annual revenues of firms for publicly traded commercial banks in the United States from 
2010 to 2015. The predictor variables (ROE and annual revenue) were archival data 
downloaded from the S&P Compustat database, which were in measurements of the ratio 
in the instrument (see Appendix D for a sample of the raw data). The criterion variables 
were from the S&P ExecuComp database, which were in ratio as well. The other 
variables such as company name and CEO name were in ordinal measurements. I used 
the instrument for collecting data of U.S. commercial banks (SIC 6020). Moore (2014) 
used the same instrument to collect data from the U.S. health insurance industry (SIC 
6320 and 6321). Chakravarty and Grewal (2016) collected data for all publicly held 
companies within electric and electronic industries based on SIC codes 3570–3695. 
Cremers and Grinstein (2014) collected data for all aspects of CEOs’ compensation from 
the S&P ExecuComp database for the period of 1993–2005. 
Data Collection Technique 
The research question of this study addressed the existence of a predictive 
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation within the U.S. banking industry. Hence, ROE of firms, annual revenues of 
firms, and CEOs’ compensation were essential information in the data collection process. 
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I collected data electronically from the S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases 
via a querying portal, and downloaded data in Microsoft Excel file format. After data 
cleaning process, the raw data went through an import process to data analysis software 
(IBM SPSS, Version 21.0), which was followed by a merging step. I only included 
archival data from years 2010 to 2015, with a filter of SIC code 6020 for commercial 
banks. 
The reason for selecting such a data collection technique was due to data 
availability, relevance, recentness, and convenience. Eckford and Barnett (2016) stated 
that the method of online data collection had benefits of obviating the need for 
preliminary data entry and saving the cost of instrument administration. Electronic forms 
of data collection make the data processing step easier than paper forms (Li et al., 2015). 
Wohlin and Aurum (2015) suggested that researchers who had difficulties with accessing 
human participants might choose to collect archival data for analysis. Also, using 
Microsoft Excel for web-based data mining was a relatively new and effective technique 
compared to the other existing ones (Makwana & Rathod, 2014). On the other hand, the 
instrument for data collection was also compatible with the statistical analysis software 
utilized for the study. IBM SPSS can convert data from Microsoft Excel files (Dezhi & 
Shuang, 2014). 
Although the archival data collection technique had the advantage of presenting 
data sources in a structured and organized fashion (Li et al., 2015), such a technique 
might also have its disadvantages. Briones and Benham (2017) argued that the Internet-
based data collection method has the selection bias toward the population who has the 
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Internet access. Wohlin and Aurum (2015) advocated that researchers should combine 
archival data collection with other data collection techniques to mitigate the impact of 
missing data components. Lastly, archival data sources were normally not intended for 
scientific research purposes, which would need some degree of data interpretation 
(Kandampully et al., 2014). 
This study did not need to include a pilot study. Sajid et al. (2016) summarized 
that the purpose of performing a pilot study is to assess the feasibility of the main study 
and derive preliminary estimators for future design. However, Moore (2014) already 
conducted a similar research using a different population from this study, which could be 
a proof of the feasibility of the study. Lancaster (2015) stated that the primary function of 
a pilot study was to evaluate the possibility of success and threats to the validity of the 
study with a small sample size. Yang et al. (2014) used a large sample size in a 
quantitative study to test the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. The pilot study also can be a simulation to the main study with 
randomization in place (Whitehead, Sully, & Campbell, 2014). Shim and Kim (2015) 
conducted a quantitative research study to examine the relationship between executives’ 
compensation and performance of firms using randomly selected samples from the 
research population. These previous studies have already indicated that the study is 
researchable. Hence, I did not conduct a pilot study before the data collection rather 
emphasizing on the data analysis to answer the research question. 
Data Analysis 
The research question and associated hypotheses of the study were as follows: 
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Does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and 
CEOs’ total compensation? 
H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between ROE of firms, 
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking 
industry. 
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between ROE of firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry. 
Pallant (2016) summarized that the statistical technique used for exploring the 
relationship between variables can be a correlation, a regression, or a factor analysis. To 
answer the above research question, I conducted a linear multiple regression analysis to 
test a set of hypotheses. The regression test was suitable for this study because the 
essence of the research question was to try to determine whether the independent 
variables were predictors of the dependent variable. Regression analysis is a statistical 
technique to explore the relationship between numerically measured independent and 
dependent variables, which emphasizes the prediction or forecasting from one variable to 
another (Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014). The hypothesized relationship of this study had the 
intention to determine the predictive relationship between variables. Armor, Cotla, and 
Stratmann (2017) argued that regression analysis enables researchers to monitor how 
criterion variable would change when predictor variables change. Regression analysis 
also involves the estimation to responses of one variable caused by the explanatory 
variables (Wiedermann, Hagmann, & von Eye, 2015). Kim, Cho, et al. (2015) employed 
multivariate regression analysis to assess the predictive relationship between the variables 
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of continuous scales. This study included the variables with measurements in ratios. 
Hence, a regression analysis was suitable. 
Curtis et al. (2016) further suggested using a scatterplot to obtain an indication of 
the correlation between variables, as well as the type of relationship, before conducting 
the test. I also used descriptive statistics to explore the description of raw data by 
including mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum, and maximum value of variables. 
Curtis et al. advised using descriptive statistics for summarizing data and describing the 
characteristics of data samples. However, Ploutz-Snyder, Fiedler, and Feiveson (2014) 
argued the importance of descriptive statistics being an early research step in statistical 
analysis. The inclusion of descriptive statistics could establish associations between the 
variables for data delineation (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). 
Although a regression analysis was optimal for the study, I evaluated the 
appropriateness of other types of analyses. Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
analysis is also a statistical technique for exploring the simple relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables (Curtis et al., 2016). Selection of 
correlational analysis depends upon the research question and the level of measurement 
(ordinal, interval, or ratio) of variables (Curtis et al., 2016). Hedge, Powell, and Sumner 
(2017) also indicated that correlation analysis is concerned with on testing the 
significance of a relationship between variables. Therefore, simple correlation analysis 
was not suitable for this study. 
Factor analysis provides the ability to combine related variables and uncover 
patterns from common groups (factors) based on a shared variance (Mthembu, Roman, & 
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Wegner, 2016). Shao et al. (2015) conducted a factor analysis study to summarize the 
components and their associations to certain cancer risks from many correlated variables. 
As well, Baglin (2014) argued that factor analysis is a process that involves repeating 
analysis (rotation) of refining solutions to reach a meaningful result. Factor analysis is for 
scientific purposes because of its power and large sample (Zygmont & Smith, 2014), 
which was not applicable for this study. 
Other types of techniques such as t tests, chi square, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), or multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) were also not applicable to 
the study. These aforementioned techniques are used to assess and compare differences 
between groups of observations or conditions (Pallant, 2016). For instance, Aghdeab, 
Mohammed, and Ubaid (2015) conducted an ANOVA analysis by a comparison to find 
out optimizations in design and manufacturing methods. Sharpe (2015) asserted that the 
chi-square analysis is a nonparametric technique to identify the difference between 
groups of participants when the dependent variable is a measurement of nominal. Wen et 
al. (2015) utilized t tests to compare two groups of participants and identify different 
effects of treatment. Vossoughi, Shahvali, and Sadeghi (2016) described that the 
MANOVA test is best of comparing the mean vector between groups, which in turn 
addresses hypotheses related to the differences between groups of data. 
Once the data collection process was complete, I began a data cleaning process. 
Data cleaning process involved scrutinizing and identifying any missing records or 
invalid components in data sets. Hashem et al. (2015) identified that data cleaning was an 
important step in the research process. The purpose of data cleaning is to minimize 
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problems by correcting invalid data or eliminating missing records (Kongara & 
Punyasesudu, 2015). Researchers may utilize either the traditional method (loading into a 
spreadsheet) or certain tools for cleaning data, such as Google OpenRefine and Data 
Wrangler by Stanford Visualization Group (Batrinca & Treleaven, 2015). Li et al. (2015) 
also pointed out that innovative data collection tools could make the data cleaning 
process efficient when involving a large amount of raw data. However, I visually scanned 
data by applying filters from the spreadsheet because the number of relevant data records 
was small. 
Then, I deleted the identified discrepancies (missing or invalid data records) from 
data sets. Cheema (2014) concluded that case deletion and imputation-based methods are 
common missing data handling approaches, where researchers can either simply discard 
those records with missing data or replace them. Cheema further stated that using 
inappropriate handling approaches might result in poorly estimated parameter and 
reduced power of analysis. Ebrahim et al. (2014) emphasized the missing data issue could 
result in poor generalization of the research and therefore developed a comprehensive 
approach to addressing the missing data issue, which included using a reference 
instrument and a complete-case analysis. Aste, Boninsegna, Freno, and Trentin (2015) 
suggested that researchers could resolve missing data problems by deleting the whole 
case in quantitative observations. In this study, the random sampling procedure provided 
the ability to ensure the samples were representative of the population because of data 
availability. Hence, the case deletion approach was still feasible. 
80 
 
Statistical analyses have underlying assumptions that researchers need to consider 
before conducting the analysis (Pallant, 2016). The normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity of data distribution are assumptions for multiple 
linear regression analysis, which represent certain patterns respectively in statistical 
plotting (Pallant, 2016). Normally distributed data depict a symmetrical mountain-peak-
shaped line; linearity is represented by a straight line (or roughly straight line), while 
homoscedastic data show a cigarette-shaped pattern (Pallant, 2016). I used histograms, a 
normal probability plot (P-P), and scatterplots to assess the normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity of data; these plots were available in IBM SPSS Version 21.0. Nunes, 
Alvarenga, de Souza Sant’Ana, Santos, and Granato (2015) pointed out that data 
homoscedasticity means that different groups of data have the same value of standard 
deviation and further suggested that researchers should utilize statistical functions to 
check for homoscedasticity. Puth, Neuhäuser, and Ruxton (2014) also suggested 
researchers should check histograms of all variables for any substantial deviation from 
normality. 
Researchers cannot always assume the normality of data, but may also use other 
methods such as bootstrapping for resampling purposes, regardless of the data 
distribution (Bro & Smilde, 2014). Nevertheless, in situations where data plots reveal a 
violation of the assumption of data distribution, I used an alternative method to carry out 
the testing procedures. Banjanovic and Osborne (2016) stated that a bootstrapping 
method could be an alternative for resampling by the researcher when violation of the 
assumption occurred. Hopkins and Ferguson (2014) also argued that researchers might 
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need to adjust data set to address a violation of the assumption in multiple regression 
analysis and ensure the accuracy of the test by data transformation. Hopkins and 
Ferguson further advised using a specialized regression technique of transformed 
variables, such as logarithm or square root. 
In SPSS Version 21.0, the default significance level is set at .05, which is a 
typical level for published nonscientific research to be considered as statistically 
significant (Ives, 2015). The result of a small p value would mean that the predictor has a 
good fit in the model to influence the response. The estimated effect size for the study 
was .20 as an input of G*Power a priori power analysis to calculate the required sample 
size. The confidence level measured how much of samples might contain true parameters 
from the population. Hedge et al. (2017) stated a simple way to calculate the confidence 
interval (CI) is 100% * (1-α). This study had the estimated CI of 95%. In a regression 
analysis, the regression coefficient represents how sensitive the change of criterion 
variable is when one of predictor variables changes (Ray-Mukherjee et al., 2014). 
Therefore, a high regression coefficient would mean that the model had a good fit or 
variables had a strong predictive relationship. 
By having completed the regression analysis, results of tests would support a 
response of whether to accept or reject predefined hypotheses, which in turn provided the 
proof to answer the research question. If the result of probability value (p value) was less 
than the significance level, as expected, the test would be significant, which would 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance to the alternative one. 
82 
 
The flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the step-by-step data analysis actions in 
SPSS. 
 




Validity of a study involves both internal and external aspects. One of the 
concerns for internal validity is the approximate truth to inferences regarding the 
examination of causal relationship (Ehiri et al., 2014). Lane and Gast (2014) stated that 
the internal validity has threats from experimental designs involving an assessment to 
effects of treatments or interventions. This study did not have concerns for threats to 
internal validity because it was not an experimental design. However, threats to statistical 
conclusion validity might be in question (Kratochwill & Levin, 2014). 
Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Threats to statistical conclusion validity might potentially exist. Statistical 
conclusion validity also refers to inferential validity, which is a form for ensuring the 
appropriateness of statistics and adequateness of findings for quantitative research 
(Rutkowski & Delandshere, 2016). Wester and Borders (2014) conducted research to 
review quantitative research articles published in the Journal of Counseling & 
Development and further criticized the existence of certain conditions might affect Type I 
and Type II error rates. Type I errors refer to the chances of rejecting a true null 
hypothesis, while Type II errors refer to the probability of accepting the null hypothesis 
when it is, in fact, false (Wester & Borders, 2014). Conditions regarding possible threats 
to statistical conclusion validity were as follows: (a) the instrument used was without 
reliability and validity check; (b) assumptions to statistical analyses were without 
satisfaction; and (c) inadequate sample size selection occurred (Wester & Borders, 2014). 
Antonakis, Bastardoz, Liu, and Schriesheim (2014) suggested using a more sophisticated 
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design and estimation procedure to minimize the threats to statistical conclusion validity 
and make the research more impactful. Next, I covered the following details to address 
concerns to statistical conclusion validity in the study. 
Reliability of the instrument. The first factor of threats the validity of statistical 
conclusions is reliability of the instrument. Cor (2016) emphasized the importance of 
study validity and recommended that researchers report the relevant instrument reliability 
by including a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha calculation. Finnegan, Runyan, Gonzalez-
Padron, and Hyun (2016) also advocated reporting a Cronbach’s alpha value to measure 
the reliability and associated significance. Lachmann, Trapp, and Trapp (2017) suggested 
performing an internal consistency check by computing a Cronbach’s alpha value to 
assess reliability. The acceptable value of the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha should be 
greater than .7. However, the sample value of Cronbach’s alpha does not have a 
minimum acceptable level even though some studies had a result of rejection for a 
Cronbach’s alpha lower than .7 (Bonett & Wright, 2015). The Cronbach's alpha has been 
widely used for assessing the internal reliability of psychological instruments (Samaha & 
Hawi, 2016), which was not applicable for this study. 
Data assumptions. Data assumptions could be a threat to statistical conclusion 
validity. Statistical analyses rely on different assumptions about data distribution. In the 
case of a violation of data assumptions, the validity of statistical conclusion would have a 
serious impact (Solomon, Howard, & Stein, 2015). Linear regression analysis shares a 
few assumptions with other types of analyses such as normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity (Pallant, 2016). For multiple linear regression, I assessed the 
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multicollinearity by using the correlation coefficients and a scatterplot between the 
predictor variables. Outliers and level of measurement were also factors that could have 
an impact on results of regression analysis, especially with a relatively small sample size 
selection (Pallant, 2016). I used a histogram, a scatterplot, and a normal P-P plot of the 
regression standardized residual to assess the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity; I 
used a boxplot to assess outliers. 
Sample size. A small sample size might not have the representativeness of the 
population, which is potentially a threat. Nuzzo (2016) asserted that quantitative studies 
with small sample size selection undermine the achievement of statistical testing power 
and significance. Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014) further argued that estimated 
effect sizes being true might support the appropriateness of various sample sizes. To 
estimate an effective sample size, Macfarlane et al. (2015) suggested researchers perform 
a power analysis before the actual studies, which minimizes the threat to study validity. 
In this study, a power analysis by using G*Power software ensured that a properly 
selected sample size was sufficient. 
External Validity 
While the internal validity of a study applies to the identified population, Khorsan 
and Crawford (2014) expounded that external validity refers to how much 
generalizability the results of studies have for expanding to a larger population, different 
measurements, or settings. Palinkas et al. (2015) stated that using a probability sampling 
strategy may increase the generalizability or transferability of the study (external 
validity). On the other hand, one of the weaknesses of a nonprobabilistic sampling 
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strategy may be the compromises to the external validity of the study. This study adopted 
a random sampling strategy, which was the probabilistic approach. Therefore, the results 
could have limitations to the selected population, which was data of CEOs’ 
compensation, ROE, and annual revenues of all commercial banks located within the 
United States. Readers should not generalize the findings and results to other industries. 
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 contained a comprehensive plan and the underlying rationale for 
conducting the research regarding determining the predictive relationship between CEO 
total compensation, ROE, and annual revenues of publicly traded commercial banks in 
the United States. This study utilized the S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat 
databases that store publicly available CEO compensation and company financial data, 
respectively. The data collection process included downloading data with the instrument 
of Microsoft Excel and cleaning data for invalid data records. This study was a 
quantitative correlational study in which the relationship between ROE, annual revenue, 
and CEOs’ compensation was explored using scatterplots, normal p-p plots, histograms, 
and multiple regression analysis. Regression coefficients, a probability value, and 
significance level were determinants for answering the research question and making a 
conclusion on the existence of a predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ compensation in the U.S. banking industry. Section 3 
presented the conclusive findings of data analysis in detail, recommendations for further 
actions or research, and implications of social change. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the predictive 
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options). 
The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm. The 
criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. From the results of the statistical 
analysis, there was a significant predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and the CEOs’ total compensation, which was based on data of a 
sample size that had moderate generalizability to the population. 
Presentation of the Findings 
The statistical analysis of sample data of ROE of U.S. banking firms, annual 
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ compensation yielded some perspectives to the regression 
model. Details of these findings in this section include (a) the testing of assumptions, (b) 
descriptive statistics, (c) inferential statistics results, and (d) a theoretical conversation 
pertaining to the findings. I used the variable transformation approach to avoid the 
potential influence of violated assumptions. Specifically, the logarithmic model depicted 
a predictive relationship between variables in percentage changes. This transformation 
was more realistically approachable due to the nature of the variables used in this study. 
Tests of Assumptions 
The data preparation and the preliminary analysis of data were important 
processes before the actual statistical analysis. Pallant (2016) emphasized the need for 
88 
 
parametric assumption evaluation to enhance the significance of the test. Initially, I 
checked for the distribution of data by plotting histograms. However, I discovered that 
none of these variables were normally distributed as a bell-shaped line (see Figure 2 for 
an example of total compensation). 
 
Figure 2. A histogram of the criterion variable of total compensation. 
Data distribution of the criterion variable was severely skewed to the right. The 
peak values were on the left side of the mean value, while the standard deviation value 
was high. In other words, most of the CEOs’ total compensation (approximately 70%) 
was relatively much lower than that of the rest of the CEOs in the sample. Very few 
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CEOs (four out of 126) had much higher total compensation than others. Therefore, the 
sample data violated the parametric assumption of data being normally distributed. 
In the case of any violations of parametric assumptions, the researcher must 
resolve such issues before starting any data analysis (Pallant, 2016). Pallant further 
suggested that transforming variables might help in better meeting the parametric 
assumptions. I used the following logarithmic transformation on all variables.  
total_compensation_log = log10(total_compensation) (1) 
revenue_log = log10(revenue) (2) 
ROE_log = log10(ROE) (3) 
where total_compensation_log, revenue_log, and ROE_log were newly 
transformed variables, which were the logarithm to the base 10 (common logarithm) of 
old variables (total_compensation, revenue, and ROE). After the variable transformation 
process, I carried out the planned procedure to test the following assumptions by 
exploring the relevant calculations and graphs. 
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity was one of the potential limitations of the 
study because the calculation of both ROE and revenue had a relation to net income. 
Specifically, ROE was the quotient of net income and shareholders’ equity, while net 
income could be the difference of revenues and total expenses. Winship and Western 
(2016) explained that multicollinearity (or, having auto-correlated predictor variables) in 
a regression model could cause problems by introducing large standard errors that impact 
the power of the test. However, the scatterplot between the logarithm of revenue and the 




Figure 3. Scatterplot of the transformed predictor variables.. 
The predictor variables (ROE_log and revenue_log) were not noticeably 
correlated because the scatterplot did not show a linear pattern. As well, the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient between the predictor variables was .386, which represented a 
small bivariate correlation level. I also evaluated values of tolerance and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) from the collinearity statistics, which were within the acceptable 
range of tolerance >.10 and VIF < 10 (see Table 2). Hence, the logarithmic model met the 







Model Variable Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)   
1 Revenue_log .851 1.175 
 ROE_log .851 1.175 
 
Outliers. Outliers are also an important aspect that a researcher needs to check 
and possibly remove. Pallant (2016) suggested inspecting the boxplot or Mahalanobis 
distances for detecting outliers. A boxplot indicated that outliers were problematic with a 
separate data point presented (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. A boxplot shows the outlier.. 
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The rectangle in the boxplot represented the distribution of most sample data. The line in 
the middle of the rectangle indicated the median value. The bars on the top and bottom of 
the rectangle leveled to the maximum and minimum values, respectively. However, the 
additional circle above the maximum value was an outlier. Based upon the number of 
predictor variables, I also checked the saved Mahalanobis distances in the data file for 
any critical chi-square value exceeding 13.82. Based on this review, I removed two 
observations separately from a total of 126 for final analysis. After a reassessment, the 
model had no additional outliers. 
Normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity are other fundamental assumptions of linear regression analyses. 
Pallant (2016) expounded that these assumptions could reveal the underlying relationship 
between variables. Pallant further advocated using different plots of standardized 
residuals for checking assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. 
Presented at the end of the analytical output, the normal plot (P-P) of regression 
standardized residual demonstrated no major deviation from normality, linearity, and 




Figure 5. The normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual. Data points of 
actual values and predicted values in the normal P-P plot formed a relatively straight 
diagonal line. 
Residuals are differences between actual values and predicted values, which 
should be normally distributed (Pallant, 2016). A histogram of standardized residuals also 




Figure 6. The histogram of regression standardized residual.. Standardized residuals of 
the criterion variable were mostly within a bell-shaped line. 
Pallant (2016) emphasized the need for checking the depiction of scatterplot and 




Figure 7. The scatterplot of regression standardized residual. . 
The scatterplot of standardized residuals did not delineate any clear and systematic 
patterns. The maximum value of Cook’s distance of .065 also confirmed that no major 
problem existed in the predictive model. Therefore, I did not identify any violation to 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics provide summarized values of variables, such as mean and 
standard deviation. Pallant (2016) advised to always check for descriptive statistics to see 
if values make sense. I utilized a total of 124 observations for the analysis, using the 
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respective logarithms of CEO’s total compensation, revenue, and ROE as variables. 
Table 3 included the descriptive statistics of variables in the study, where the standard 
deviation of each variable was not reasonably high. 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Transformed Variables 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation N 
Total_compensation_log 6.2896 .36705 124 
Revenue_log 8.9621 .63959 124 
ROE_log 1.0158 .32054 124 
 
Inferential Results  
In the final model, I invoked the standard multiple linear regression procedures, 
α=.05 (two-tailed), to examine the efficacy of ROE and revenue in predicting CEO’s total 
compensation. The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenues of the 
firm. The criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. The null hypothesis was that 
a significant predictive relationship did not exist between ROE, annual revenue, and 
CEO’s total compensation. The alternative hypothesis was that a significant predictive 
relationship existed between ROE, annual revenue, and CEO’s total compensation.  
Results of preliminary data analyses revealed violations to parametric 
assumptions. However, the variable transformation technique was in place to combat the 
influence of assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity; the transformed 
model had no serious violations identified (see Tests of Assumptions). The model as a 
whole was able to significantly predict CEO’s total compensation, F (2, 121) = 95.691, p 
< .000. The correlation coefficient was .783, indicating that approximately 61% of 
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variations in the logarithm of CEO’s total compensation was attributed to the linear 
combination of predictor variables (logarithms of ROE and annual revenue).  
Despite the fact that a combination of ROE and annual revenue were statistically 
significant to the total compensation, annual revenue alone (t = 12.714, p < .000) 
accounted for the contribution to the whole model. ROE did not explain any significant 
variation in CEO’s total compensation (t = .124, p > .05). Standardized coefficients of the 
model also explained that annual revenue contributed vastly more than ROE in the model 
(see Table 4 for model summary and coefficients).  
Table 4 
 



















ΔR2 B SE Beta 
Model 1     .000 .613 .606 
        
(Constant) 2.27
0 
.296  7.669 .000   
Revenue_log .447 .035 .780 12.714 .000   
ROE_log .009 .070 .008 .124 .901   
Note. N = 124; criterion variable = total_compensation_log. 
The final predictive equation was:  
log10 Y (Total compensation) = β0 + β1*log10 (Revenue) + β2* log10 (ROE) (4) 
or,  
Y (Total compensation) = 10 β0*(Revenue) β1*(ROE) β2 (5) 
where β0 was the constant and βi was the coefficient for unstandardized coefficient 
of each predictor variable. Taking an example, the CEO’s total compensation should be 
close to $5952446.66, given Y = 10 2.270 * ($10317361000) .447 * (12.89) .009. 
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Tarasova and Tarasov (2016) stated that elasticity showed the relative change of 
an index under the influence of the change of another index, while the other indexes were 
holding as constants. To transform the above equation further by differentiating it, β1 and 










Figure 8. The elasticity in the criterion variable and the predictor variables. β1 and β2 
represented the percentage change of the total compensation with respect to percentage 
changes of revenue and ROE individually. 
Revenue. The coefficient for revenue (.447) as a predictor of total compensation 
indicated that approximately a 44.7% increase in CEO’s total compensation for every 1% 
increase in annual revenues of the firm. In other words, CEO’s total compensation tended 
to increase dramatically as annual revenues of the firm increased. Standardized 
coefficient for revenue (.780) indicated that revenue contributed far more than ROE did 
(standardized coefficient = .008) in the predictive model (see Table 4).  
Return on equity. The coefficient for ROE (.009) as a predictor of total 
compensation indicated an almost 1% increase in CEO’s total compensation for every 1% 
increase in ROE of the firm. In other words, the change in ROE of the firm had minimal 




Additionally, Pallant (2016) expounded that the adjusted R2 (ΔR2) from the output 
involved steps of taking the number of variables and the sample size into consideration. 
Given the adjusted R2 (.606) was in the close range of the R2 (.613), the regression model 
was relatively reliable (see Table 4). However, Daderman and Basinska (2016) suggested 
cross-validating the model by reporting the adjusted R2 from the calculation of Stein's 
formula (see Figure 9), which predicts the generalizability of the regression model to a 
different sample from the same population.  
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Figure 9. Stein’s formula. 
The adjusted R2 could also be a result of the calculation involving the number of 
participants (n) and the number of predictors (k). Incorporating values of n and k into the 
equation, the result of such a calculation was the adjusted R2 = .597, compared to the R2 
of the model at .613, which indicated good generalizability. 
Analysis summary. The purpose of this study was to examine the predictive 
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation. I used multiple linear regression to examine the ability of ROE and annual 
revenue to predict the value of CEO’s total compensation, using the logarithmically 
transformed variables. The assessment of assumptions of multiple linear regression was 
successful because the transformation of variables and removing outliers enhanced the 
model. The logarithmic model could significantly predict CEO’s total compensation, F 
(2, 121) = 95.691, p < .000, R2 = .613. The conclusion from this analysis was that ROE of 
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firms and annual revenues of firms had an association with CEOs’ total compensation. In 
particular, annual revenues of firms were sensitive to CEOs’ total compensation. 
Theoretical conversation on findings. Based on the results of data analysis, I 
rejected the null hypothesis that a significant predictive relationship did not exist between 
ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation. ROE and annual 
revenues of firms significantly predicted CEOs’ total compensation among U.S. publicly 
traded commercial banks. Such a finding conformed to the supposition of agency theory, 
which explained the principal-agent relationship. Annual revenue (annual sales) is one of 
the simple indicators of financial performance of a firm, while CEO’s compensation is 
the representation of the agent’s interest in the business context. Feng et al. (2017) found 
that annual revenue was a more manageable ratio of growth of a firm. A predictive 
relationship between performance of a firm and CEO’s compensation meant that both the 
principal’s interests and the agent’s interests were aligned.  
Unlike annual revenue, ROE of a firm is a more complex measurement on profits; 
ROE incorporates debts and net income into the equation. Therefore, ROE of a firm 
might be more difficult for predicting a CEO’s compensation. Ahsan (2013) argued that 
ROE was the figure with manipulability, which might have flaws in measuring 
performance of a firm. Overall, findings of this study dovetailed with Nulla (2013a)’s 
study, where the relationship between financial performance of a firm and CEO’s 
compensation existed.  
These findings echo those of Moore (2014)’s research for the U.S. health 
insurance industry, in which annual revenue of a firm was a dominating factor in 
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predicting CEO’s total compensation. Banker et al. (2013) also found a negative 
relationship between performance of a firm, measured by ROE and CEO’s compensation 
using data from 1993 to 2006. However, compensation committees should consider 
different varieties of performance measurement, regarding building an effective CEO 
incentive plan. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The results of this study can help BODs to understand the use of different types of 
incentives (bonuses, stock awards, option awards, and so on) for compensating CEOs, 
which should align with financial performance of their firms. Lin et al. (2013) found that 
misaligned relationship between CEO’s compensation and performance of the firm 
existed in some industries. Hence, compensation committees in the banking industry 
should continue to keep the aligned relationship between CEOs’ compensation and 
performance of the firm. Obtaining a statistically significant model could allow for a 
competitive total compensation structure within the industry.  
Business practices in different industries may vary. The results of this study 
enhanced the known knowledge about the relationship between performance of the firm 
and CEO’s compensation in the U.S. banking industry. ROE is one of the most common 
measurements of performance in the banking industry (Klaassen & van Eeghen, 2015). 
However, Klaassen and van Eeghen further asserted that ROE is a short-term 
measurement that omits risks. Having obtained knowledge of a specific industry, 
compensation committees will be able to develop an efficient CEO’s compensation 
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structure, which reflects the percentage changes in ROE, annual revenue, and CEO’s 
compensation, to balance the performance of the firm with CEO’s incentives. 
Based on findings of the regression model, annual revenue and ROE of firms had 
a significant predictive relationship to CEOs’ total compensation. Bennett, Bettis, 
Gopalan, and Milbourn (2017) argued that benchmarking performance-based components 
in the compensation package would be a good business practice for evaluating the 
strategy of CEOs’ compensation structure. Business leaders could utilize the regression 
formula to measure if their CEOs currently have proper compensation for the 
performance of the firm, or to determine their compensation for the future. 
Implications for Social Change 
The general public demand a pay raise due to a high inflation rate. As well, the 
rapid growth of CEOs’ compensation has drawn much of public attentions (Gopalan, 
Milbourn, Song, & Thakor, 2014). Individuals’ concern on the unfairness of wealth 
distribution or the significance of income inequity has been widely persistent in society 
(Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014). The contribution to social change of this study involved 
having individuals in societies understand the rationale for why CEOs’ and the average 
employees’ compensation have some disparities, as well as the public perception on how 
performance of firms correlates to their CEOs’ total compensation. Additionally, the 
growth of CEOs’ compensation must be tied to performance of firms (Abraham, Harris, 
& Auerbach, 2014). Using the results of this study, stakeholders of firms might also 
acquire an understanding of the importance of how to award impartial compensation 
packages to CEOs. 
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Recommendations for Action 
Financial performance of firms had a positive influence on their CEOs’ total 
compensation among U.S. commercial banks. Such a finding coincided with the results 
of research in other industries (Moore, 2014; Nulla, 2013b). Compensation committees of 
U.S. banking firms should pay attention to this study and could use the findings of the 
study to evaluate their current CEO compensation packages and fine-tune their 
compensation plans accordingly. Specifically, compensation committees need to perform 
periodic reviews of statistical relationship on total compensation of CEOs, using revenue 
as one source of data to represent performance of the firm. However, compensation 
committees can only use ROE to evaluate a limited statistical relationship. By doing these 
reviews, BODs may record the risks for any tangible discrepancies of mismatched CEO’s 
compensation to performance of the firm. BODs should further initiate remedial actions 
based on these findings. 
Besides compensation committees and BODs, potential audiences of this study 
are scholars and investors. Scholars may use results of the study for considering further 
research on performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Investors can rely on careful 
analysis of data or evidence from the research to make their investment decisions 
(Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 2015). Therefore, I will publish the final version 
of the study in the ProQuest dissertations database; or submit a refined version to 
economics-related journals. Using these publications, I thereby disseminate findings of 
this study to other scholars. Furthermore, results of the study may also be available to 
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investors in appropriate forums of professional gatherings, such as conferences or 
workshops on economics, finance, and management. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
I only used data from the past 6 years in this study. Enlarging the sample size in 
the future research could also improve generalizability of results (Nuzzo, 2016). Further 
studies into the relationship between financial performance of firms and CEOs’ 
compensation within the U.S. banking industry could focus on the examination of data 
from a more extended period. Abraham et al. (2014) suggested structuring a sample 
within a single industry, which might have specific characteristics to impact CEOs’ 
compensation.  
Further studies could also cover the population in other industries. Annual 
revenue and ROE are potentially auto-correlated. Pallant (2016) pointed out that the 
existence of multicollinearity would jeopardize the regression model. To address the 
limitation of this study, I suggest using different variables that measure performance of 
the firm, such as the stock price, current ratio, or cash flow. Additionally, future studies 
may include other types of variables that might affect CEO’s compensation or 
performance of the firm, such as total assets of the firm or interest rates. 
Reflections 
Overall, the research process has been a challenging and exciting experience. To 
address the data assumption and maintain the power of statistical testing, I had to 
transform all the originally proposed variables into forms of the logarithm, as well as to 
reduce the sample size from 126 to 124. However, the preemptive expectations did not 
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impact results of the study because the transformed variables demonstrated a strong fit 
for the model. Even though the results showed a predictive relationship existed between 
the financial performance of U.S. banking firms and CEOs’ total compensation, the 
results of the study surprised me that ROEs alone did not have the positive relationship to 
CEOs’ total compensation.  
During the proposal stage, I expected that the predictive relationship between 
financial performance of U.S. banking firms and CEOs’ compensation would exist. 
Specifically, I expected both annual revenue and ROE would predict CEOs’ total 
compensation. However, little doubt on the existence of such a relationship started to 
emerge during the literature review phase, which motivated me to continue the research. 
Although I had the basic statistical skills before engaging in the data analysis, I improved 
my skills of regression data analysis and extended my knowledge of quantitative 
research. Furthermore, the research process required extensive time for planning, 
implementation, and iteration. I have greatly benefited from such an experience by 
improving the time-management skills, both on professional and personal levels. 
Conclusion  
The main finding of this study showed that a significant predictive relationship 
exists between the financial performance of firms and CEOs’ total compensation. Such a 
finding was in favor of the argument from agency theory. However, the finding was 
limited to one aspect of the performance of firms: the measure of annual revenues. The 
response of compensation to the proportional changes in annual revenues was much more 
definitive than in ROE. Compensation committees should continue to maintain and 
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improve CEOs’ incentives to ensure the proper alignment between performance of the 
firm and CEOs’ compensation. 
Previous studies focused on examination of the relationship between financial 
performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. These studies, such as those by Lin et al. 
(2013), Nulla (2013a), Nulla (2013b), and Moore (2014) yielded controversial results. 
However, studies in the banking industry were rare. According to agency theory, aligning 
performance of the firm with CEO’s compensation is imperative because CEOs (act as 
agents of firms) may have conflicting interests to those of owners of firms (the principal; 
Mitnick, 2015). Using a standard multiple linear regression, I performed data analysis on 
a sample data set to answer the research question of whether a significant predictive 
relationship existed between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total 
compensation in the U.S. banking industry. From the results of data analysis, I found that 
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Appendix A: Frequency and Percentage of Total Sources 
This study includes a total of 222 references, of which 212 articles (95.5%) are 
from peer-reviewed journals and six articles (2.7%) are from non-peer-reviewed journals. 
Two books and two dissertations, representing 0.9% of total sources, respectively, are 
also included. The total number of sources published within 5 years is 210, which 
accounts for 94.6% of all sources. Of the articles used in the study, 201 were published in 




Appendix B: Statement Regarding Data Collection 
Walden University’s directive states that researchers are required to obtain IRB 
approval before collection of any data. I used publicly available archival data for the 
study after obtaining IRB approval. To collect such data prior to IRB approval, as 






Appendix C: Statement Regarding Permissions for Data and Instrumentation 
The study involved analysis of archival data from databases and annual reports 
that were publicly available. I did not need to obtain permissions for collecting data 
because the datasets were not proprietary and there were no human participants in the 
process. Additionally, I used raw archival data for analysis; therefore, permission related 






























.000 3175.039 368.070 4804263.00 2578000000 11.1
9 





75.000 1990.200 3748012.00 277567000.
0 
5.00 
SIVB 912.333 .000 2092.890 670.964 3676187.00 1519559000 14.1
8 
 
